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Abstract 
 
A significant number of manufacturers have started to sell their products through 
company-owned stores as well as through independent retailers. More interestingly, 
many do so in direct competition with their retailers. In addition, growth in the use of 
the Internet for commerce and developments in logistics have increased the ways a 
manufacturer might reach its end customers.  
In this thesis, we study a manufacturer’s problem of managing its direct sales 
channel alongside an independently-owned bricks-and-mortar retail channel, when the 
channels compete in price. We develop multi-stage game theoretical models of the 
relation between the manufacturer and the retailer. We study two different dual channel 
models: In Model 1, the manufacturer’s direct channel is online, whereas the retail 
channel is traditional. In this model, we assume a population of consumers that are 
heterogeneous in their channel preferences. Our focus is on understanding how 
consumer valuation and the relative attractiveness of the channels affect the 
manufacturer’s dual channel strategies. In Model 2, we did not specify particular 
channel formats. In this model, our focus is on the interaction of the dual channel 
strategy with the double marginalization issue. To this end, we compare the results in 
centralized and decentralized scenarios under different price sensitivity combinations in 
the two channels. We also illustrate our findings in the two models through numerical 
examples. 
 
 
 vi
İKİLİ SATIŞ KANALLARININ FİYAT REKABETİ ALTINDA YÖNETİLMESİ 
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Anahtar Kelimeler: ikili kanallar, doğrudan kanal, perakende satış kanalı, fiyat 
rekabeti, oyun teorisi, tedarik zinciri kontratları, çifte tekel karı, müşteri tercihleri 
 
Özet 
 
 
Önemli sayıda üretici ürünlerini hem kendi mağazalarından hem de bağımsız 
perakendeciler üzerinden satmaya başlamıştır. Çoğu üretici bunu perakendecilerle 
doğrudan rekabet içinde yapmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, ticaret için İnternet kullanımının 
artması ve lojistikteki gelişmeler, üreticilerin müşterilere ulaşma yollarını 
arttırtmaktadır.  
Bu tezde, üreticilerin fiyat rekabeti ortamında hem bağımsız geleneksel perakendeci 
kanalları hem de kendi doğrudan satış kanallarını yönetme problemi üzerinde çalıştık. 
Üretici ve perakendeci arasındaki ilişkiyi oyun kuramı kullanarak çok aşamalı şekilde 
modelledik. İki farklı ikili kanal modelini çalıştık: Model 1’de üreticinin doğrudan 
kanalını İnternet, perakendeci kanalını ise geleneksel olarak ele aldık ve müşterilerin 
kanal tercihlerinde heterojen olduğunu varsaydık. Müşterinin ürüne değer biçmesinin ve 
kanalların göreceli çekiciliğinin üreticinin ikili kanal stratejilerini nasıl etkilediğini 
araştırdık. Model 2’de, belirli kanal biçimleri belirtmedik. Bu modelde, ikili kanal 
stratejisinin çifte tekel karı problemi ile etkileşimi üzerine odaklandık. Bu amaçla, farklı 
fiyat duyarlılığı kombinasyonları ele alınarak merkezileşmiş ve dağıtılmış senaryoların 
sonuçlarını karşılaştırdık. Her iki modeldeki bulgularımızı sayısal örnekler kullanarak 
da açıkladık. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recently, “channel management” has arisen as an important area of study for both 
operations management and marketing. Channel management is a process by which a 
company creates formalized strategies for servicing customers within a specific channel. 
A distribution channel is a chain of intermediaries, each passing the product down the 
chain until it reaches to the end-customer. For a company, distribution channel choice is 
a significant decision to make, because there have been major developments that 
broaden the feasible set of sales and the environment has become very competitive. 
After producing the product, how to bring it to the intended customers is a crucial 
strategic issue. Since market conditions, tastes, and technology are rapidly changing, 
companies are experimenting with various alternative distribution strategies including 
selling direct, through vertically-integrated retailers, through independent retailers, 
through franchised retailers, or through a multi-channel distribution system involving 
some combination of these alternatives (Table 1-1).  
 
Table  1-1: Alternative Distribution Strategies 
Format of 
the channel Retailer Manufacturer
Online
Physical
Ownership
Retailer sells her products 
through the Internet. Ex: Amazon, 
ebay, ebebek, etc.                           
Manufacturer reaches his 
customers through online stores. 
Ex: HP, Dell, IBM, Pioneer 
Electronics, Cisco System, Estee 
Lauder, Sony, etc.  
Retailers sell her products in 
physical stores. Ex: Toshiba, 
Boyner, Darty, etc.  
Manufacturers open their 
manufacturer-owned stores. Ex: 
Polo Ralph Lauren, DKNY, Liz 
Claiborne, and Armani, Zara, etc. 
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A significant number of manufacturers have redesigned their channel structures. 
Some manufacturers sell their products through direct sales channel (either through 
company-owned stores or through online stores) as well as through independent 
retailers. Such systems are known as “dual sales channels”. In this case, the 
manufacturer simultaneously acts as a supplier as well as a competitor to the retailer. 
Customers’ choice of channels depends on their needs and characteristics and also on the 
characteristics of products. For instance, price sensitive customers might patronize the 
online store for a lower price whereas service-sensitive customers might patronize the 
traditional retail channel. Most of the manufacturer-owned stores are opened out of the 
city centers and customers may not prefer to travel so far to buy their needs. A customer 
may buy a book from an online store, but may be unwilling to buy a more expensive and 
valuable product over the Internet. 
Selling through the direct channel offers a number of advantages. To begin with, the 
manufacturers may want “go direct” in part to motivate retailers to perform more 
effectively. The threat to sell in the direct channel might induce greater sales in the 
traditional retail channel (the independent retailer lowers its price and increases sales 
volume) and the manufacturer can increase his profits in the retail channel. Moreover, it 
helps the manufacturer improve overall profitability by reducing double marginalization. 
In addition to this, the manufacturer may increase its market coverage and profit by 
servicing to the different needs of customer segments with separate channels. 
Consequently, a number of top suppliers in a variety of industries have started to open 
their own stores. For example, Nike opened a Niketown store in downtown Chicago to 
reach individual consumers (Collinger 1998). A number of well-known manufacturers 
such as Polo Ralph Lauren, DKNY, Liz Claiborne, and Armani have their company-
owned stores and also independent retailers such as Macy’s and Nordstrom that carry 
these brands in their stores. Goodyear opened Goodyear Tire Centers to sell the products 
through his own stores as well as through independent retail stores (Bell et al. 2002). 
The dual channel strategy might also offer some benefits to the retailer. The 
introduction of the direct channel can be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction. 
Since each channel member influences other channel members’ decisions, the retailer 
can exercise some control over the manufacturer. Consumers may benefit from the 
opportunity of speaking to more knowledgeable salespeople in company-owned stores, 
and this might trigger sales in the retail channel.  
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Opening a direct channel, however, may lead to severe problems. Since the 
manufacturer becomes a competitor for the retailer, the retailer can think that the 
manufacturer steals her business and cannibalize her sales. This leads to “channel 
conflict”. Since problems affect manufacturer profits, the manufacturer has an incentive 
to use contractual mechanisms which would help control the retailer who sell his 
product. Some manufacturers try to convince retailers that their direct channels attract 
attention of customer segments that would otherwise not buy. On the other hand, some 
other manufacturers had to stop direct sales to avoid channel conflict.  
More recently, the use of Internet for commerce has created new opportunities to 
manufacturers for accessing to end customers efficiently. As a result, many 
manufacturers have started selling directly online, complementing their existing retail 
distribution channels. Selling online potentially can increase the market for a 
manufacturer and reduce the costs of operations. Independent structure of the Internet 
business gives the opportunity of being more flexible and independent to get the 
business up and running quickly. The customers get the chance of searching through the 
Internet and comparing a product with another one in a short time. Online stores offer 
greater time-savings. Customers can also order products from other countries. 
Manufacturers may offer price discounts on Internet sales and if customers require no 
retail sales effort, then buying from the Internet may become more profitable.  
In real world, a number of top companies sell their products through their online 
stores. HP, for example, has been operating an online direct channel, hpshopping.com, 
since 1998. Levi’s also reaches its consumers through jeans-online. Nike, Dell, Pioneer 
Electronics, Estee Lauder, Sony etc. are other examples of manufacturers engaging in 
direct online sales. 
Selling through the Internet, however, causes a number of disadvantages. Retailers 
become concerned that Internet sales may affect sales from a retail store since customers 
can buy at a lower price on the Internet and a new channel threatens existing channel 
relationships. This results in channel conflict, similar to company-owned stores’ 
disadvantages. Levi Strauss & Co. is one of the companies that experienced channel 
conflict. Independent retailers of Levi Strauss & Co. reacted when Levi’s started to sell 
his products through his online store (Bucklin et al. 1997). Avon Products Inc. (Machlis 
1998c), IBM (Nasiretti 1998), Bass Ale (Bucklin et al. 1997), the former Compaq 
(McWilliams 1998), Mattel (Bannon 2000), and others have reported similar conflicts. 
The customers also face a number of disadvantages such as waiting for product delivery 
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and paying for shipping. In addition, a customer may want to touch, taste or smell the 
product instead of a virtual description on the internet.  
In this thesis, we determine how a manufacturer can effectively manage its direct 
channel and an independent bricks-and-mortar retail channel when the channels compete 
in price. To do so, we develop two models that incorporate the key characteristics of the 
dual sales management with price competition. Both models are game-theoretic and 
contain three stages: (1) Contracting stage where the manufacturer offers a wholesale 
price contract to the retailer; (2) A pricing game where the firms determine the channel 
prices in a simultaneous-move game; (3) Consumer choice stage where a number of 
consumers choose which channel to buy from. We solve these models with backwards 
induction and obtain the equilibrium outcome for a given set of model parameters.  
In the first model, the manufacturer’s direct channel is in online format whereas the 
retailer’s channel is in traditional (physical) format. We study how consumer 
preferences towards the channel formats affect the manufacturer’s dual channel strategy. 
We determine the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy as a function of the 
customers’ valuation of the product and their relative preference towards the direct 
online channel. To do so, we compare the results from a set of six possible channel 
strategies including dual, direct-only and retailer-only structures. 
 In the second model, we do not specify particular formats for the channels. The 
consumer demand in each channel is modeled as a function of the prices in both 
channels. Our focus is on understanding how the dual channel strategy of the 
manufacturer interacts with the double marginalization issue. To this end, we first study 
a benchmark case in which a centralized firm owns both the manufacturer and the 
retailer. Next, we study a decentralized case with independent firms, and compare the 
results with the centralized case to assess the inefficiencies due to double 
marginalization.  
We illustrate our discussion through numerical examples and figures. To this end, 
we coded the models in Mathematica and Matlab. 
We use game theory to model the relationship between the manufacturer and the 
retailer. Next, we provide background information on game theory. 
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Game Theory  
Game theory is the study of multiperson decision problems and strategic behavior. Game 
theory helps us understand the observed phenomena when multiple decision makers who 
are strategically dependent interact (Gibbons 1992). In game theory, players-the 
decision makers, rules- the order of moving for the players, outcomes- the outcomes for 
each possible set of actions by the players and payoffs- the players’ preferences over the 
possible outcomes are the basic elements of a game. Bidding in an auction, firms’ price-
setting behavior, a firm’s entry into a new industry, a commuter’s time to leave home to 
avoid traffic etc. are some known examples of games. Moreover, game theorists have 
performed very important developments using game theory. For instance, economists 
have innovated auctions of radio spectrum licenses for cell phones, computer scientists 
have developed new software algorithms and routing protocols, political scientists have 
improved election laws, military strategists have created notions of strategies of 
deterrence and biologists have determined the species that become extinct by using 
game theory1.  Game theory is a significant tool, because it develops methodologies that 
apply in principle to all interactive situations.   
Game theory has also become popular in business. In business, interactions with 
customers, suppliers, other business partners, and competitors as well as interactions 
across people and different organizations within the firm play a significant role in any 
decision. There are consulting firms that apply innovative thinking and practical tools, 
detect business value, define a plan of action and solve business issues using game 
theory. IBM Business Strategy Consulting, NERA Economic Consulting, Criterion 
Economics etc. are some of the popular consulting firms that use game theory as a tool 
to analyze business issues.  
In game theory, when making a decision, the outcome for each player depends on 
the actions of others. In business, most firms consider other players’ actions, particularly 
competitors, while making their decisions. Advanced Micro Device’s (AMD) action 
against Intel, his rival, is a good example to illustrate how competitors’ choices impact a 
firm’s decisions (Spooner 2002). Intel dropped the prices of its desktop processors. Just 
days after Intel’s action, AMD cut its prices of desktop and mobile Athlon processors to 
stay competitive on prices. AMD’s price-chopping illustrates that AMD observed its 
rival, Intel’s actions and slashed its prices, because it did not want to give up market 
                                                 
1 http://www.gametheory.net 
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share gains. In this example, the companies compete in price in order to gain market 
share. Companies that engage in price competition generally do not benefit from such 
competition. In this example, both Intel and AMD would have done better if they kept 
their prices higher instead of cutting prices. In game theory, this phenomenon is 
illustrated by the well-known “Prisoners dilemma” (see Gibbons 1992 for further 
information). Game theory is also used in designing markets and auctions. As an 
example, The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) used game theory to design 
an auction for the next generation of paging services. The auctions’ results were better 
than expected (Bennett 1994).  
The analysis of game-theoretical models rests on certain assumptions. Decision 
makers are assumed to be expected utility maximizers and expected to be rational. In 
game theory, players make a simple choice, and know how their choices and the choices 
of other players combine to determine monetary payoffs. Standard equilibrium analysis 
assume that all players form beliefs based on an analysis of what others might do, 
choose the best response, and adjust best responses and beliefs until they are mutually 
consistent. In sequential-move (multi-stage) games, a player is assumed to anticipate the 
outcome of a latter stage when making his decision at a prior stage. Although widely 
used in theoretical models, such assumptions are known to be violated in practice and 
there are deviations from a game-theoretical model’s predictions.  
We develop game-theoretical models in this thesis. As a future study, one can 
conduct decision-making experiments with human decision makers based on our 
theoretical results. To support such a future study, we conducted background research on 
the topic of behavioral and experimental economics. We decided to include this work as 
part of this thesis (Appendix A) although we did not conduct any experiments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
There is a growing literature on dual channel management, reviewed by Tsay and 
Agrawal (2004a), and by Cattani et al. (2004). Most papers in this area study 
competition in price and/or marketing effort. Bell et al. (2003) study price competition 
and compare the results of two cases; a single manufacturer selling to three independent 
retailers and again a single manufacturer selling to three independent retailers, but one of 
which is his own store. Ahn et al. (2002) consider price competition between 
independent retailers and manufacturer-owned stores where the manufacturer stores are 
in remote locations. Chiang et al. (2003) find that the manufacturer is more profitable 
even if no sales occur in the direct channel. Kumar and Ruan (2002) study the strategic 
forces that influence the manufacturer’s decision when there are two types of customers: 
retail-loyal customers and brand-loyal customers. Ingene and Parry (1995(b), 1998, 
2000) study issues of channel coordination faced by a manufacturer and two retailers 
that compete on price. 
Tsay and Agrawal (2001) consider a single manufacturer whose end customer 
market is sensitive to both price and sales effort. The authors study the inefficiency due 
to double marginalization within the reseller channel. Rhee and Park (2000) and Chiang 
et al. (2003) see the direct channel as a way to keep prices low by combating double 
marginalization. Bell et al. (2003) mention that the manufacturer can tolerate some 
degree of relative inefficiency in retailing to avoid double marginalization.  
A number of researchers study service competition between different firms (not 
necessarily in a dual channel setting). In Hall and Porteus (2000), customers may switch 
to a competitor if they receive poor service. Bernstein and Federgruen (2002) examine 
an oligopoly in which sales are awarded based on the competitors’ service levels. Lal 
(1990) examines the coordination of a franchise system in which the retailers engage in 
service competition. Winter (1993), Iyer (1998), and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) consider 
retailers that compete directly along both price and service competition. Chen et al. 
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(2008) study a manufacturer’s problem of managing his direct online sales channel 
together with a retail channel, when the channels compete in service. 
Tsay and Agrawal (2004b) evaluate three different distribution strategies, retailer-
only, direct-only and dual channel, focusing on channel conflict. Cattani et al. (2006) 
analyze a scenario where a manufacturer opens up a direct Internet channel that is in 
competition with the traditional retail channel. However, different from Tsay and 
Agrawal (2004b)’s study, their formulation explicitly models the channel preferences of 
heterogeneous customers. Hendershott and Zhang (2006) analyze a model with a 
manufacturer and multiple, heterogeneous intermediaries. Their empirical research 
reveals that using direct sales benefit both the consumers and the upstream firms with 
market power, but on the other hand intermediaries suffer from increased competition 
from direct sales.  
Most of the research consider deterministic demand and ignores the effects of 
inventory. Boyaci (2005) and Seifert et al. (2006) are exceptions. Boyaci (2005) 
considers a setting where a manufacturer sells through both a direct channel and a 
traditional channel, but his research focuses on stocking levels under stochastic demand 
and on developing mechanisms for supply chain coordination. Seifert et al. (2006) 
assume that a manufacturer has a direct market that serves a different customer segment 
than the retail channel. The authors provide insight into the setting by which supply 
chains with direct and indirect channels can be integrated and operated in a mutually 
beneficial way with stochastic demands. Netessine and Rudi (2006) model the dual 
strategy as a noncooperative game among a number of retailers and a wholesaler. The 
authors analyze comparative advantages of inventory ownership in the traditional 
channel and risk pooling under drop-shipping.  
Supply chain contracting research is also relevant to our work. Katok and Wu 
(2006) investigate the performance of the wholesale price, the buyback, and the revenue-
sharing contracts in a newsvendor setting. These three contacting mechanisms are 
compared in the controlled laboratory setting and the subjects in the experiments either 
play a retailer or a supplier against a computer-simulated opponent. These authors 
suggest games in which both players are human as a future research direction. Ho and 
Zhang (2007) find that contrary to the standard economic theories, the introduction of 
the fixed fee does not increase channel efficiency and the two-part tariff and the quantity 
discount contracts are not equivalent. Katok et al. (2006) investigate the effect of the 
length of the review period and the magnitude of bonus for meeting or exceeding the 
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service-level target. Keser and Paleologo (2004) suggest an experimental investigation 
of a simple supplier-retailer wholesale price contract in a world of stochastic demand. In 
the model, the supplier offers the wholesale price and the retailer chooses the order 
quantity. These authors observe that the wholesale price contract yields an efficiency 
that is not significantly different from the equilibrium prediction. Cui, Raja and Zhang 
(2006) study how fairness may affect channel coordination. These authors show that the 
manufacturer can coordinate the channel with a simple wholesale price above its 
marginal cost when channel members are concerned about fairness.  
We also conducted a literature search on the areas of behavioral and experimental 
economics. We present this work in Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3   MODEL-1 
In this section, we consider a single manufacturer (he) who sells a product through both 
his direct online channel and a traditional (physical) retail channel (she). We study how 
the manufacturer can manage these two channels when the channels compete in price.  
The market for the product consists of N consumers. Each consumer may buy the 
product from either the direct channel or the retail channel, or may not buy at all. We 
assume that consumers are heterogeneous in their channel preferences and that they are 
uniformly distributed along a unit-length line. The two channels are located at the two 
ends of this line as shown in Figure  3-1. We measure the distance of a particular 
consumer from the direct channel with the distance d, which we refer to as “the mental 
distance to the direct channel”. A consumer with small d value prefers the direct 
channel more than a consumer with a high d distance. This characterization of the 
consumer population is similar to the well-known “linear city” model of Hotelling 
(1929).   
Figure  3-1: The Consumer Population 
 
We model the relationship as a three-stage game, as presented in Figure  3-2. The 
sequence of events is as follows: 
At stage 1, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price w and offers the contract to 
the retailer. The retailer accepts the contract if his profit is non-negative; i.e., if * 0rΠ ≥ .  
Note that we assume a retailer reservation profit level of zero without loss of generality.  
0 1d*
The direct online channel                 The retail channel
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At stage 2, the firms engage in a “pricing game”. Given the wholesale price, the 
retailer sets the selling price rP  in the retail channel, and the manufacturer sets the 
selling price dP  in the direct channel. Each decision maker makes his/her decision 
without observing the other’s decision, leading to a simultaneous-move game.  
At stage 3, consumer demand is realized. Depending on the sales prices rP  and dP   
and a number of other model parameters, each consumer decides which channel to buy 
from, or not to buy at all. The retailer observes qr, the demand in the retail channel 
(quantity sold in this channel), orders this quantity from the manufacturer and satisfies 
the demand in the retail channel. Note that the retailer procures to order, that is, we are 
not interested in inventory. The manufacturer directly satisfies the demand in the direct 
channel (quantity sold in this channel), qd. He operates make to order. The manufacturer 
can satisfy all demand, i.e. there is no capacity constraint.  
Figure  3-2: Sequence of Events 
 
We solve the three-stage model with backwards induction. First, we characterize 
the demand satisfied through the direct and the retail channels in stage 3. Next, we study 
stage 2, the pricing game. At this stage, both the manufacturer and the retailer know 
how the market will be split at stage 3, based on the prices they set, however, each of 
them is unaware of the other’s decision. Given w, we establish the best responses of the 
manufacturer and the retailer to each others’ actions. We then solve these functions 
simultaneously to determine the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game.  Finally, at stage 
1, we solve for the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, w. Next, we explain the 
 
Wholesale 
price, w  
Retail channel 
price, Pr 
Direct channel 
Price, Pd 
Consumers 
Retail channel 
demand, qr 
Direct channel 
demand, qd 
STAGE-3 
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
STAGE-2 STAGE-1 
Direct 
Online Ch.
Lost consumers, ql 
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consumers’ channel choice process in detail. Each consumer derives a value v from 
buying the product. In his channel choice decision, the consumer compares the utilities 
he would obtain by buying the product from the two channels. These utilities depend on 
the distance d of the consumer which represents his “mental distance” from the direct 
channel. The consumer with distance d derives the following utility from buying the 
product from the direct channel 
( ) .d du d v P kd= − −  
Here, the parameter “ 0k ≥ ” denotes the unattractiveness of the direct channel 
relative to the retail channel. We refer to it as “the direct channel relative preference 
disadvantage parameter”, or “the disadvantage parameter” for short. Note that the utility 
of the consumer decreases in his distance d, in the sales price dP  that the manufacturer 
determines, and in the disadvantage parameter k, which is a model parameter.  
The utility that this consumer derives from buying from the retail channel is  
( ) (1 )r ru d v P d= − − − . 
Note that we do not have a parameter similar to k in this formulation. The 
parameter k denotes the relative disadvantage of the direct channel compared to the 
retail channel, and hence it suffices to introduce it only in the direct channel utility 
expression.  
To determine how the consumer population will be split between the two channels, 
we determine the consumer who is indifferent between buying from the two channels. 
As seen from Figure  3-1, this consumer is located at *d  such that  
* 1( , ) min{{ ( ) ( )},1} min ,1 .
1
r d
r d d r
P Pd P P d u d u d
k
+ −⎧ ⎫≡ = = ⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭           (  3-1 ) 
Given this characterization of *d , the channels’ respective demands are as follows: 
* 1( , ) ( , ) ,
1
r d
d d r d r
P Pq P P Nd P P N
k
+ −= = +  
*( , ) [1 ( , )] .
1
d r
r d r d r
k P Pq P P N d P P N
k
+ −= − = +  
Note that this split is valid when the consumer with distance *d  derives a positive 
utility from buying the product. Other cases are also possible.  Depending on dP  and 
rP , both channels might not be operative. In addition, not all of the consumer market 
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might be covered (i.e., there might be lost consumers). Based on these possibilities, we 
analyze three cases each containing two subcases, as illustrated in Table  3-1. 
 
Table  3-1: Channel Strategies 
Channel strategies Dual channel Direct Channel Only Retail Channel Only
Full coverage Case 1a Case 2a Case 3a
Partial coverage Case 1b Case 2b Case 3b  
 
 Before moving on to the detailed analysis of these cases, we briefly list a number 
of assumptions: 
- If a consumer is indifferent between the two channels (i.e., the consumer at 
distance *d ) and if he derives positive utility, he will buy from the direct 
channel.  
- If the manufacturer’s profit is the same for more than one case, we assume that 
he chooses the case that provides the highest profit for the retailer.   
3.1 Case-1 Dual Channel 
In this channel strategy, the manufacturer sells his product through both the direct 
channel and the retail channel. According to the utilities that the consumers derive from 
the channels, the market is either fully covered or there exists lost sales.  
3.1.1 Case-1a Dual Channel - Full Coverage 
In this case, both channels are operative and there is no lost consumer as illustrated in 
Figure  3-3.  Consumers with *d d≤  buy from the direct channel and consumers with 
*d d>  buy from the retail channel. Figure  3-3 also presents the utility values as a 
function of the consumers’ distances d. 
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Figure  3-3: Consumer Utility Functions in Dual Channel-Full Coverage Case 
 
The following conditions on , , ,r dP P v  and k needs to be satisfied for this case to be 
observed: 
i) * [0,1]d ∈ , which requires 1 r dP P k− ≤ − ≤ , 
ii)  * *( ) ( ) 0d ru d u d= ≥ , which requires (1 ) (1 ) 0d rv k P k P+ − − + ≥ ,    
iii) ( , ) 0r d rP PΠ ≥ , which requires ( ) 0r r rP w q P w− ≥ ⇔ ≥ .  
From the definition of *d  in (3-1), the consumer demands are realized as follows: 
1( , )
1
r d
d d r
P Pq P P N
k
+ −= + ,   ( , ) 1
d r
r d r
k P Pq P P N
k
+ −= + . 
Next we solve the second stage pricing game. At this stage, we determine the best 
response functions of the manufacturer and the retailer to each others’ actions and solve 
these functions simultaneously to determine the prices in the Nash equilibrium. 
The manufacturer aims to maximize his profit through the sales in the direct online 
channel and the retail channel. Hence, given his w  from stage 1, the manufacturer’s 
objective in stage 2 is 
max ( , ) ( , )
d
m d d r d r d rP
q P P P q P P w∏ = + . 
We substitute the quantity functions into the manufacturer’s objective function and 
obtain ( )2max (1 ) ( )1d m d r d rP N P P w P k P wkΠ = − + + + + −+ . The first-order condition gives 
( ) 2* 2 21 2 0, 0,1 1m mr dd d
N Nw P P
P k P k
∂Π ∂ Π −= + + − = = <∂ + ∂ +  
                                                                    *
1( )
2
r
d r
w PP P + += .                                                    (  3-2 ) 
v-P d 
v-P r 
d=0 d=1   d*
ud =v-Pd -kd ur =v-Pr -(1-d)
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This function illustrates the manufacturer’s price choice in the direct channel for 
any price that the retailer might set in his channel. From (3-2), we observe that when the 
retailer sets a higher price, the manufacturer responds by setting a higher price.  
Next, we solve the retailer’s problem  
( )max ( , )
r
r r d r rP
q P P P wΠ = − . 
We substitute the quantity functions into the retailer’s objective function and obtain 
( ) ( )( )2max 1r r r d r dP N P k P w P k P wkΠ = − + + + − ++ . The first-order condition gives 
2
*
2
2( 2 ) 0, 0,
1 1
r r
d r
r r
N Nw k P P
P k P k
∂Π ∂ Π −= + + − = = <∂ + ∂ +  
                                                                    *( ) .
2
d
r d
k w PP P + +=                                                   (  3-3 ) 
Similar to the manufacturer’s best response, we observe that when the manufacturer 
sets a higher price in the direct online channel, the retailer responds by setting a higher 
price in the retail channel.  
We solve (3-2) and (3-3) simultaneously and determine the prices in equilibrium as 
follows: 
      ( ) ( )* *1 1( ) 2 3 , ( ) 1 2 3 .
3 3d r
P w k w P w k w= + + = + +                                           
We observe that the sales prices in both channels increase if the wholesale price 
increases or if the online channel disadvantage parameter k increases. For a given 
increase in k, the retail channel price increases more than the direct channel price. This 
is because an increase in k makes the direct channel less attractive in the consumers’ 
eye. Hence, the manufacturer cannot increase his price in the direct channel as much as 
the retailer.  
One expects the direct channel selling price to decrease when the direct channel 
becomes more disadvantageous. However, this is not the case, because there exists a 
strategic interaction. When k increases, the retailer increases her sales price to take 
advantage of the situation. This, however, allows the manufacturer to increase his 
selling price in the direct channel, although not as much as the retailer. The reason 
behind this result is that the total market size N is constant in this model and it does not 
decrease when both channels increase their prices. If N depended on prices, the results 
would be different.   
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Given dP  and rP ,  the sales quantities are found as 
         * 2
3(1 )d
kq N
k
+= + ,  
* 1 2 .
3(1 )r
kq N
k
+= +  
We observe that the quantities sold in the channels are independent of the wholesale 
price w (as long as the case conditions are satisfied). The quantities sold depend on the 
disadvantage parameter, k, of the direct channel. Intuitively, when the direct channel 
becomes more disadvantageous, the consumers migrate from the direct channel to the 
retail channel (if they are willing to buy the product).  
Next, we rewrite the case conditions using the dP  and rP  expressions:  
i) To have * [0,1]d ∈ ,     
    * * 11 ( ) ( ) .
2r d
P w P w k k− ≤ − ≤ ⇔ ≥ −  This condition always holds because 
0k ≥ .  
ii) To have * *( ) ( ) 0d ru d u d= ≥ ,  
     * (2 1)( 2)(1 ) (1 ) 0 .
3(1 )d r
k kv k P k P w v
k
+ ++ − − + ≥ ⇔ ≤ − + This condition provides 
an upper bound on the possible wholesale price values that the manufacturer can set at 
stage 1. 
iii) To have *( )rP w w≥ , 
( ) ( )1 1 2 3 1 2 0
3
k w w k+ + ≥ ⇔ + ≥ , which always holds.  
At stage 1, we solve for the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price *w . Note that 
the manufacturer’s w decision needs to satisfy 0w ≥ , and also the upper bound from 
condition (ii). Hence, his problem becomes 
( 2 1)( 2)0
3(1 )
max ( )
k kw and w v
k
m d d rq P w q w+ +≥ ≤ − +
∏ = + . 
We substitute the values of , , ,r d r dP P q q  in equilibrium into the manufacturer’s 
profit function to obtain  
( )( 2 1)( 2)0
3(1 )
2max ( ) 4 9 (4 9 )
9(1 )k kw and w v k
m
Nw k w k w
k+ +≥ ≤ − +
Π = + + + ++ . 
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The manufacturer’s profit mΠ  is linearly increasing in w . Hence, the manufacturer 
would choose the highest possible w value. We study two subcases based on the range 
of w.   
Case 1a-i 
 If  (2 1)( 2) 0
3(1 )
k kv
k
+ +− >+ , then 
* (2 1)( 2) ,
3(1 )
k kw v
k
+ += − + since the manufacturer sets the 
highest possible wholesale price value to maximize his profit.  
The sales quantities in equilibrium are * 2
3(1 )d
kq N
k
+= +  and 
* 1 2 .
3(1 )r
kq N
k
+= +  
 Next, we substitute *w  into the price and the profit equations to obtain the values in 
equilibrium as 
The prices are 
2
* 2 3 (1 )
3(1 )d
k k v kP
k
+ − += − +  and 
* 1 3 ( 2 3 ) .
3(1 )r
v k vP
k
− + + − += +  
The profits are 
2
* ( 2 5 (9 11) 9 )
9(1 )m
k k v vN
k
− − + − +Π = +  and 
2
* (1 2 ) .
9(1 )r
kN
k
+Π = +  
Case 1a-ii  
If  (2 1)( 2) 0
3(1 )
k kv
k
+ +− ≤+ , then the manufacturer sets the wholesale price as
* 0.w =  He 
considers that instead of selling only to a part of the market, it is better to set w as low as 
possible and make the retailer sell through the retail channel as well. Consequently, all 
the market is covered.                    
The sales quantities in equilibrium are * 2
3(1 )d
kq N
k
+= +  and 
* 1 2 .
3(1 )r
kq N
k
+= +  
Next, we obtain the price and profit values in equilibrium as 
The prices are ( )* 1 2
3d
P k= +  and ( )* 1 1 2 .
3r
P k= +  
The profits are 
2
* (2 )
9 1m
N k
k
⎛ ⎞+Π = ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 and 
2
* (1 2 ) .
9 1r
N k
k
⎛ ⎞+Π = ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
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3.1.2 Case-1b Dual Channel - Partial Coverage  
In this case, both channels are operative, however some consumers are lost. The direct 
channel and the retail channel have local monopoly power and the market is not totally 
covered, as shown in Figure  3-4. That is, the consumer located at *d  who would be 
indifferent between the two channels derives a negative utility from buying the product 
and hence does not buy. We define 1d  as the location of the consumer who derives zero 
utility from the direct channel in this setting; 1 1 1( ) 0 .dd d
v Pu d v P kd d
k
−= − − = → =  
Similarly, the location of the consumer who derives zero utility from the retail channel 
in this setting is defined as 2d ; 2 2 2( ) (1 ) 0 1 .r r ru d v P d d v P= − − − = → = − +  
 
 
v-Pr
u d =v-P d -kd
u r =v-P r -(1-d)
  Lost sales
d*
v-Pd
d=0 d=1d1 d2
 
Figure  3-4: Consumer Utility Functions in Dual Channel-Partial Coverage Case 
 
For this case, the following conditions should be satisfied:  
i) * [0,1]d ∈ , which requires 1r dP P− ≥ −  and r dP P k− ≤ , 
ii) * *( ) ( ) 0d ru d u d= ≤ , which requires (1 ) (1 ) 0d rv k P k P+ − − + ≤ , 
iii) 1 0d ≥ , which requires dP v≤ , 
iv) 2 1d ≤ , which requires rP v≤ , 
v) ( , ) 0r d rP PΠ ≥ , which requires ( ) 0r r rP w q P w− ≥ ⇔ ≥ .  
                                     
As seen from Figure  3-4, the demands in the direct and retail channel are  
1( , ) dd d r
v Pq P P Nd N
k
−⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and ( ) ( )2( , ) 1 .r d r rq P P N d N v P= − = −  Note that 
demand in each channel is independent of the price in the other channel because each 
firm acts as a local monopoly as long as the case conditions are satisfied. Hence, we do 
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need to search for a Nash equilibrium. Given w, we solve for the problems of the 
manufacturer and the retailer independently. 
The manufacturer’s problem is to maximize his profit through the sales in the direct 
online channel and the retail channel. His objective is 
max ( , ) ( , )
d
m d d r d r d rP
q P P P q P P w∏ = + . 
At stage 2, we solve for the selling prices independently. We substitute the quantity 
functions into the manufacturer’s objective function and obtain 
( )2max
d
d d
m rP
vP PN v P w
k
⎛ ⎞−Π = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.   The first-order condition is 
( )*2 0.m d
d
N v P
P k
∂Π = − =∂  
The second-order condition is satisfied and the manufacturer’s optimal direct online 
channel price is calculated as * .
2d
vP =  Note that *dP  does not depend on w  or on rP , 
because as mentioned, each firm acts as a local monopoly.  
Next, we solve for the retailer’s problem  
( )max ( , )
r
r r d r rP
q P P P wΠ = − . 
We substitute the quantity functions into the retailer’s objective function and obtain 
( )( )2max
r
r r rP
P v w P vwΠ = − + + − . The first-order condition is  
( )2 0.r r
r
N v P w
P
∂Π = − + =∂  
The second-order condition is satisfied and the retailer’s optimal sales price is 
calculated as *( ) .
2r
v wP w +=   
Given dP  and rP , the sales quantities are as follows: 
* ,
2d
vq N
k
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
*( ) .
2r
v wq w N −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Next, we rewrite the case conditions using the dP  and rP  expressions, 
i) To have * [0,1]d ∈ ,    
* * *1 2r dP P w− ≥ − ⇔ ≥ − ; this is always true since * 0w ≥ . On the other hand, the 
other inequality provides a constraint for *w ; * * * 2 ,r dP P k w k− ≤ ⇔ ≤  
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ii) To have * *( ) ( ) 0d ru d u d= ≤ , * * *(1 ) (1 ) 0 2 ,d r vv k P k P w vk
⎛ ⎞+ − − + ≤ ⇔ ≥ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
hence we have a lower bound on *w . 
iii) To have 1 0d ≥ , * .2d
vP v v≤ ⇔ ≤  This condition always holds. 
iv) To have 2 1d ≤ , * *rP v w v≤ ⇔ ≤ , 
v) To have *( )rP w w≥ , * .2
v w w w v+ ≥ ⇔ ≤  
We determine the following constrains on “w” by considering all of the related 
conditions above 
    ( )*max 0, 2 min 2 , .v v w k v
k
⎛ ⎞+ − ≤ ≤⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                   
At stage 1, we find the manufacturer’s wholesale price, *w . The manufacturer 
problem is 
max(0, 2) min( 2 , )
max .
v v w k v
k
m d d rq P q w+ − ≤ ≤ ∏ = +  
We substitute the values of , , ,r d r dP P q q  in equilibrium into the manufacturer’s 
profit function to obtain 
max(0, 2) min( 2 , )
2
max ( ) 2 ( )
4v v w k vk
m
N vw w v w
k+ − ≤ ≤
⎛ ⎞Π = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
We determine that one of the roots of the objective function is negative, whereas 
the other is positive. In addition, we have w v≤  as a case constraint. Hence, the 
constraints on w can be simplified to the following:  
* *2 2 .v v w and w k
k
⎛ ⎞+ − ≤ ≤⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
The manufacturer aims to maximize his profit, so we check for the first and the 
second order conditions 
2
20, 0,2
m m
d
vN w N
w P
∂Π ∂ Π⎛ ⎞= − = = − <⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  
* .
2
vw =  
This is what the manufacturer would set as the wholesale price in the absence of the 
constraints. Next, we study how the constraints affect the manufacturer’s decision. We 
have 0,v ≥  and 0k ≥ , but there is not a particular relation between these two 
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parameters. Hence, considering the range of w and the value that maximizes the 
manufacturer’s profit, we consider three subcases. Let 2v v
k
θ ⎛ ⎞≡ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  to simplify the 
expressions. 
Case 1b-i 
In this subcase, we assume that 2kθ > , then there is no solution.  
Case 1b-ii 
If 2kθ =  and 2k v≤ , then * 2 .w kθ= =  Hence, this case is only possible when 2v k= .  
We substitute *w  into the price and the profit equations. The prices in equilibrium 
are  *
2d
vP k= =  and * * 2 2
2 2r r
v w v kP P k+ += ⇔ = = . 
We substitute the values of prices into  1 d
v Pd
k
−=  and 2 1 rd v P= − +  to calculate 
the resulting threshold distance values as *1 12
vd
k
= =  and *2 1 1.2
vd k= − + =   
Given *1d  and 
*
2d , we find that all the market is covered by the manufacturer, as 
shown in Figure  3-5. Hence, this subcase reverts to Case 2a in which there is only the 
direct channel and it provides full coverage (we study this case in the following 
section). The sales quantities in equilibrium are; *
2d
vq N N
k
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
* * 2 0
2 2r r
v w v kq N q N− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⇔ = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ .  
 
        v-Pd
ud(d=1)
ud=v-Pd-kd
d=1 d=0
 
Figure  3-5: Consumer Utility Functions in Dual Channel-Partial Coverage Case 1b-ii 
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The profits in equilibrium are    
         
2 2
* * 22 ( ) 2 4
4 4m m
N v N vw v w kv k N k
k k
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞Π = + − ⇔ Π = + − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 and * 0.rΠ =  
Case 1b-iii 
 If 2kθ < , then we study three subcases based on the range of w,  
Case 1b-iii-a 
If 2
2
v kθ< < , then * 2 .vw v
k
θ ⎛ ⎞= = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
We substitute *w  into the price and the profit equations to obtain the values in 
equilibrium. 
The prices in equilibrium are  *
2d
vP =    and  * * 1
2 2r r
v w vP P v
k
+= ⇔ = + − . 
The threshold distance values are *1 2
vd
k
=   and  *2 .2
vd
k
=   
The quantities in equilibrium are *
2d
vq N
k
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   and   
* 1 .
2r
vq N
k
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
In this subcase, the market is totally covered because * *1 2d d=  (see Figure  3-6). 
Hence, for this subcase, case 1b reverts to case 1a because we achieve full coverage by 
the two channels.  
 
v-Pr
        v-Pd
 d1=d2  d=1 d=0
ud=v-Pd-kd
ur=v-Pr-(1-d)
 
Figure  3-6: Consumer Utility Functions in Dual Channel-Partial Coverage Case 1b-iii-a 
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The profits in equilibrium are; 
2 2
*
2
2 2
2 4m
v v vN v
k k k
⎛ ⎞Π = − + + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 and 
2
* 1 .
2r
vN
k
⎛ ⎞Π = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Case 1b-iii-b 
If 2
2
v kθ ≤ < , then * .
2
vw =  As we calculated before, the manufacturer’s profit function 
is concave and has  achieves the maximum for * .
2
vw =  
We substitute *w  into the price and the profit equations to get the values in 
equilibrium. 
The prices in equilibrium are *
2d
vP =  and * * 3 .
2 4r r
v w vP P+= ⇔ =  
The resulting threshold distance values are *1 2
vd
k
=  and *2 1 .4
vd = −   
The sales quantities in equilibrium are *
2d
vq N
k
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
*
2r
v wq N −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
* .
4r
vq N⇔ =  
In this case, there exits lost consumers (see Figure  3-7). 
 
 
Figure  3-7: Consumer Utility Functions in Dual Channel-Partial Coverage Case 1b-iii-b 
 
v-P r 
ud =v-Pd -kd ur =v-Pr -(1-d)
  Lost sales
v-P d 
d=0 d=1 d1=v/2k d2=1-v/4 
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The profits in equilibrium are 
2 2 2
* *2 ( )
4 4 2m m
N v N v vw v w
k k
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞Π = + − ⇔ Π = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 and 
( ) 22* .
4 16r
N Nvv wΠ = − ⇔  
Case 1b-iii-c 
If 2
2
vkθ < ≤ , then  the case conditions are not satisfied because 2v v
k
θ ⎛ ⎞≡ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
0k ≥ cannot be satisfied together. For this subcase, there is no feasible region and 
consequently, there exits no possible solution.  
3.2 Case-2 Direct Channel Only 
In this case, the manufacturer sells only through the direct channel. Hence, there is no 
need to consider any action related to the retailer (such as the contract or rP ).  We 
consider the full and partial market coverage subcases.   
3.2.1 Case-2a Direct Channel Only - Full Coverage 
In this case, the direct channel serves all the consumers in the market as illustrated in 
Figure  3-8. 
 
 
Figure  3-8: Consumer Utility Functions in Direct Channel Only -Full Coverage Case 
 
Next, we define the conditions on  ,dP v  and k  such that this case is observed. The 
only condition is that the utility of the consumer located at 1d =  (the one who has the 
        v-P d 
u d (d=1) 
ud=v-Pd -kd
 d=1  d=0 
 25
least desire to buy from the direct online channel) satisfies ( 1) 0du d = ≥ . This 
requires dP v k≤ − . 
Assuming that the condition is satisfied, the direct online channel has demand 
( , )d r dq P P N=  if dP v k≤ −  (i.e., if all consumers are willing to buy from the direct 
online channel) (see Figure  3-8).  
The profit function of the manufacturer is max ( , ) .
d
m d d r dP
q P P P∏ =  Then his optimal 
selling price and optimal profit are as follows: 
* ,dP v k= −         * ( ).m N v kΠ = −  
3.2.2 Case-2b Direct Channel Only - Partial Coverage 
In this case, the manufacturer chooses to sell only to a part of the market. The market is 
“not totally covered,” in that some consumers do not buy (see Figure  3-9). The 
manufacturer might choose to leave out consumers with *1d d> , because selling to these 
consumers require the manufacturer to reduce the selling price. Hence, in some cases, it 
might be better to serve only to part of the market, by keeping a high selling price. 
 
 
Figure  3-9: Consumer Utility Functions in Direct Channel Only -Partial Coverage Case 
 
The only condition to observe this case is: 10 1d
v Pd
k
−≤ = ≤  requires dP v≤  and 
.dP v k≥ −  
  If the condition is satisfied, then the demand is, * ( , ) dd d r
v Pq P P N
k
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . As a 
result, the market is “not covered”. 
        v-P d 
 d=1  d=0 
Lost sales
d du v P kd= − −
( )1 /dd v P k= −
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The objective function of the manufacturer is max ( , ) .
d
m d d r dP
q P P P∏ =  Substituting 
the demand function, this becomes ( )2max .
d
m d dP
N P vP
k
Π = − + We check for the first-
order and the second-order conditions, 
2
*
2
2( 2 ) 0, 0,m md
d d
N Nv P
P k P k
∂Π ∂ Π= − = = − <∂ ∂  
*
2d
vP = , if * 2dP v k k v≥ − ⇔ ≥  is satisfied. 
By substituting the optimal direct online channel price value into the demand and 
profit functions , we determine the optimal sales quantity and profit of the manufacturer 
as follows: 
* ,
2d
vq N
k
=               
2
* .
4m
vN
k
⎛ ⎞Π = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Intuitively, if the online channel relative preference disadvantage parameter, k  
increases, both the sales quantity and the manufacturer’s profit decrease. On the other 
hand, if the consumer valuation v increases, the manufacturer’s sales and profit would 
increase.  
3.3 Case-3 Retail Channel Only 
In Case 3, the direct channel does not exist and there is no need to calculate dP . The 
manufacturer sells his product only through the retail channel. At stage 1, the 
manufacturer offers the wholesale price to the retailer. At stage 2, if the retailer accepts 
the contract, she sets her selling price, rP . At stage 3, consumer demand is realized. 
Again, we study two subcases depend on the market coverage. 
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3.3.1 Case-3a Retail Channel Only - Full Coverage 
In this case, all consumers buy from the retail channel as illustrated in Figure  3-10. 
 
 
Figure  3-10: Consumer Utility Functions in Retail Channel Only - Full Coverage Case 
 
For this case to be observed, the following conditions should be satisfied: 
i) ( 0) 0ru d = ≥  , which requires 1rP v≤ − , 
ii) ( , ) 0r d rP PΠ ≥ , which requires ( ) 0r r rP w q P w− ≥ ⇔ ≥ . 
If the conditions are satisfied, the retail channel demand is *( , )r d rq P P N=   Hence, 
the  objective function of the retailer is, ( ) ( )max ( , ) .
r
r r d r r rP
q P P P w N P wΠ = − = −   
This function is linearly increasing in rP . Hence, the retailer sets the maximum 
sales price value that the constraints permit, which is * 1rP v= − .   
The manufacturer’s objective is, 
0 1
max ( , ) .m r d rw v q P P w Nw≤ ≤ − Π = =  This function is 
linearly increasing in w. Since * * 1rw P v≤ = − ,  the manufacturer sets * 1w v= −   
We substitute the values in equilibrium into the profit functions. We find that the 
retailer cannot make any profit, * 0rΠ =  and the manufacturer’s profit is * ( 1)m N vΠ = − . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v-P r 
  d=0  d=1 
( )1r ru v P d= − − −
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3.3.2 Case-3b Retail Channel Only - Partial Coverage 
In this case, the retailer chooses not to serve all consumers in the market, as illustrated 
in Figure  3-11.  Some consumers are lost.    
 
Figure  3-11: Consumer Utility Functions in Retail Channel Only – Partial Coverage 
Case 
 
Let 2d  denote the distance of the consumer who is indifferent between buying from 
the retail channel or not buying. We have 2 1 .rd v P= − +  The following conditions on 
, ,rP v and k need to be satisfied for this case to be observed: 
i)  [ ]2 0,1d ∈ , which  requires ( )1 rv P v− ≤ ≤ , 
ii) ( , ) 0r d rP PΠ ≥ , which requires ( ) 0r r rP w q P w− ≥ ⇔ ≥ . 
If the conditions are satisfied, the demand is ( ) ( )r r rq P N v P= − .  
The retailer’s objective is ( )
1
max
r
r r rv P v
q P w
− ≤ ≤
Π = − . Substituting the demand 
function, we obtain ( )( )2max .
r
r r rP
N P v w P vwΠ = − + + −  This function is concave in rP , 
and the first order condition yields * .
2r
v wP +=  Given rP , the sales quantity is found as 
*( ) .
2r
v wq w N −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 Next, we rewrite the case conditions using the rP  expression: 
i) To have ( ) *1 rv P v− ≤ ≤ ,  ( ) ( )1 2 ,2
v wv v v w v+− ≤ ≤ ⇔ − ≤ ≤  
ii) To have *( ) ,rP w w≥   .2
v w w w v+ ≥ ⇔ ≤  
 d=1  d=0 
Lost sales
( )1r ru v P d= − − −
2 1 rd v P= − +
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We determine the following constraints on “w” by considering all related 
conditions 
( ) *max 0, 2 .v w v− ≤ ≤  
The manufacturer’s objective is 
max(0, 2)
max rv w v q w− ≤ ≤ . Substituting  the value of rq , we 
obtain 
max(0, 2) max(0, 2)
max ( ) max
2m r mv w v v w v
v wN v P w N w
− ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤
−⎛ ⎞Π = − ⇔ Π = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . From the first-
order ans second-order conditions, 
( ) 2 22 0, 0,2m m
N v w N
w w
∂Π ∂ Π= − = = − <∂ ∂  
* .
2
vw =  
This is the wholesale price that the manufacturer would set in the absence of the 
constraints. The manufacturer’s objective function has roots at 0w =  and w v= . 
Considering this finding and the constraints, *w  must be in the range [ ]0, .v  Thus, we 
study two subcases: 
Case 3b-i 
If ( 2) 4
2
v v v≥ − ⇔ ≤ , then *
2
vw = . We substitute the value of *w  into the sales 
quantity, price and profit functions to determine the equilibrium values: 
The retail channel’s equilibrium price is  * * 3 .
2 4r r
v w vP P+= ⇔ =   
The retail channel’s  equilibrium sales quantity  is * * .
2 4r r
v w vq N q N−⎛ ⎞= ⇔ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
As a result, the equilibrium profits are 
2
* * * * *
2
* * * *
( ) ,
16
.
8
r r r r
m r m
vq P w N
vq w N
Π = − ⇔Π =
Π = ⇔Π =
 
Case 3b-ii 
If ( 2) 4,
2
v v v< − ⇔ > then * 2w v= − . Substituting *w  into relevant equations, we 
determine the following: 
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The retail channel’s equilbirum price is * * 1.
2r r
v wP P v+= ⇔ = −  
The retail channel’s  equilibrium quantity sold is * * .
2r r
v wq N q N−⎛ ⎞= ⇔ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
The profits in equilibrium are 
* * * * *
* * * *
( ) ,
( 2).
r r r r
m r m
q P w N
q w N v
Π = − ⇔ Π =
Π = ⇔ Π = −  
When the manufacturer sets * 2w v= − , the market is totally covered. For these 
values, case 3b reverts to case 3a Hence, the only relevant solution for Case 3b is the 
one we identified in Case 3b-i. 
3.4 Numerical Illustration of the Manufacturer’s Optimal Channel Strategy 
Our model has only two parameters: the value v the consumer derives from the product 
and k, the direct channel relative preference disadvantage parameter. In this section we 
provide graphical illustrations of how the equilibrium values of the wholesale price w , 
direct channel price dP , retail channel price rP , direct channel sales quantity dq , retail 
channel sales quantity rq , the manufacturer’s profit mΠ  and the retailer’s profit rΠ  
change with respect to these two parameters.  
The outcome for a given parameter set belongs to one of the six types of possible 
“cases” as summarized in Table  3-1. Each of these cases corresponds to a “channel 
strategy” for the manufacturer because the manufacturer determines which case to use. 
We use the notation in the Table  3-2 in references to these six strategies (or, cases).  
 
Table  3-2: Notation for Channel Strategies 
Channel Strateies Dual Channel Direct Channel Only Retail Channel Only
Full coverage DuF DiF ReF
Partial coverage DuP DiP ReP  
 
Recall that a case might not be “feasible” for a given ( , )v k  couple if the parameters 
do not satisfy the case’s necessary conditions (as discussed in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). 
To determine the equilibrium outcome for a given ( , )v k couple, we compare the 
manufacturer’s profit in each “feasible” case. We choose the case in which the 
manufacturer’s profit is the largest. If more than one case provide the largest profit for 
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the manufacturer, we choose the case among these in which the retailer’s profit is the 
highest. If both profits are the same for a number of cases, we choose the optimal case 
considering the following priority order; dual channel full coverage, dual channel partial 
coverage, direct channel full coverage, direct channel partial coverage, retail channel 
full coverage and retail channel partial coverage. We developed and used a Matlab code 
to determine the optimal equilibrium outcome for the manufacturer.  
Table  3-3 provides the strategy choices for a sample set of ( , )v k  pairs. The details 
are provided in Appendix B. Figures 3-12 to 3-20 provide a graphical illustration of the 
equilibrium values. Note that the v values in Table  3-3 are listed in descending order so 
as to provide the same angle of view with the subsequent figures. 
 
Table  3-3: Sample Results of the Optimal Strategies 
 
 
We observe that the full-coverage strategies DiF, DuF and ReF dominate the table. 
The partial coverage strategies DiP and DuP are observed in the boundaries between the 
three dominant full-coverage strategies. The sixth strategy ReP is not observed.  
When the relative disadvantage of the direct channel k is low and the consumer 
valuation v is high, the manufacturer prefers to sell only through the direct channel (DiF 
strategy). He manages to satisfy the whole market demand (Figure  3-15). These are the 
parameter combinations for which the manufacturer achieves the highest profit (Figure 
 3-19). Within this strategy, the manufacturer reduces the direct channel sales price if 
consumer valuation decreases or if the disadvantage parameter increases (Figure  3-13). 
Starting from the high-v, low-k region, when the k value increases, the direct 
channel is put into a disadvantage. For k=1, the manufacturer switches to the dual 
channel full coverage strategy (DuF strategy). He begins to use the retail channel to 
serve the consumers that have high d value.  
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3
3 DiF DiF DiF DiF DuF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF
2.75 DiF DiF DiF DiF DuF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF
2.5 DiF DiF DiF DiF DuF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF
2.25 DiF DiF DiF DiF DuF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF ReF
2 DiF DiF DiF DiF DuF ReF ReF ReF DuP ReF ReF ReF ReF
1.75 DiF DiF DiF DiF DiP ReF ReF DuP DuP ReF ReF ReF ReF
1.5 DiF DiF DiF DiP DiP DuP DuP DuP DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF
1.25 DiF DiF DiF DiP DuP DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF
1 DiF DiF DiP DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF
0.75 DiF DiF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF
0.5 DiF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF
0.25 DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF DuF
v k
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If the k value increases further (while v is high), the manufacturer abandons his 
direct channel and begins to sell only through the retail channel (ReF strategy). 
Although the retailer satisfies all consumer demand (Figure  3-16), her profit level is 
zero (Figure  3-20), because the wholesale price is equal to the sales price (Figure  3-12 
and Figure  3-14). Note that the wholesale price, retailer’s sale price and the profit 
values within this strategy are increasing in consumers’ valuation v (Figure  3-12, Figure 
 3-14, Figure  3-19 and Figure  3-20). However, these values are independent of k because 
the direct channel is inoperative in this strategy.   
For low valuation v values, the dual channel full coverage (DuF) strategy is 
dominant. In this strategy, neither channel can set a very high sales price because 
consumers would not pay so much (Figure  3-13 and Figure  3-14). Hence, the 
manufacturer decides to use both channels to better serve the consumers. Low-d 
consumers are served through the direct channel and high-d consumers are served 
through the retail channel. Within this strategy, as k increases, both channels increase 
their sales prices, but the retail channel increases its price more because of the 
increasing disadvantage of the direct channel (Figure  3-13 and Figure  3-14). Unlike the 
sales prices, the quantities sold in the channels do not change much with respect to 
changes in k (Figure  3-15 and Figure  3-16). The manufacturer has to offer a low 
wholesale price because he needs to keep the retail channel in business (Figure  3-12). 
Hence, the manufacturer’s lowest profits are observed with these parameter 
combinations whereas the retailer enjoys her highest profits (Figure  3-19 and Figure 
 3-20).  
The partial-coverage strategies are only observed at the boundaries for average 
values of v and k. By definition, some consumers are lost with these strategies (Figure 
 3-17 and Figure  3-18). For example, starting from the DiF strategy region, if k increases 
and v decreases, the manufacturer first switches to the DiP strategy. That is, he 
continues to sell only through the direct channel, but because consumer valuation 
decreases and because the relative disadvantage of the direct channel increases, he does 
not aim to serve high-d consumers. If k increases and v decreases further, the 
manufacturer switches to the dual channel full coverage strategy (DuF strategy) and 
uses the retail channel to serve consumers with high d values. Starting from the ReF-
strategy region with average relative inconvenience k values (1.25-2.00), as the 
consumer valuation v decreases, the manufacturer first switches to the DuP strategy. 
Due to the decreasing consumer valuation, the manufacturer aims to use both channels 
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to reach all consumers efficiently. When v decreases further, the manufacturer has to 
switch to a full-coverage strategy (DuF). 
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Figure  3-12: *w  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-13: *dP  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-14: *rP  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-15: *dq  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-16: *rq  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-17: *lq  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-18: *tq  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-19: *mΠ  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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Figure  3-20: *rΠ  Based on the Parameters v and k 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 MODEL-2 
We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer with a traditional channel partner (a 
retailer) opens a direct channel that is in competition with the retail channel. First, we 
will consider the problem of a centralized firm that owns both the direct channel and the 
retail channel to obtain a benchmark. Next, we will consider the decentralized case 
where the manufacturer and the retailer are independent decision makers and each aims 
to maximize his/her own profit. Comparing the two cases, we will determine the effect 
of decentralized decision making. 
Consider a single manufacturer (he) and a single retailer (she). The manufacturer 
distributes his product through 1. His wholly-owned channel (the direct channel) 2. An 
independent bricks-and-mortar (physical) retail channel. For simplicity, we assume that 
the manufacturer produces his product without any cost. Channels engage in price 
competition.  
The sequence of events is as follows (and summarized in Figure  4-1): 
At stage 1, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price w and offers the contract to 
the retailer. If the retailer’s profit is nonnegative *( 0)rΠ ≥ , she accepts the contract.  
At stage 2, the manufacturer and the retailer engage in a simultaneous-move price 
competition game. The manufacturer sets dP , the selling price in the direct channel, 
without observing the retailer’s decision for the retail channel. The retailer sets rP , the 
selling price in the retail channel, without observing the manufacturer’s decision for the 
direct channel.  
At stage 3, consumer demand is realized based on the prices at both channels. The 
manufacturer directly satisfies the demand in the direct channel qd. He operates make to 
order. The retailer observes qr, the demand in the retail channel, and orders this quantity 
from the manufacturer to satisfy demand. The retailer procures to order, that is, we are 
not interested in inventory. Note that the manufacturer can produce to meet all demand, 
i.e. there is no capacity constraint.  
Both the manufacturer and the retailer aim to maximize their own profits.  
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Figure  4-1: Sequence of Events 
 
Next, we explain the model details and outline how we solved the model with 
backwards induction.  
At stage 3, the demand in the direct channel depends on the prices in both channels 
as follows: 
( , ) 1d d r d d rq P P b P P= − + .                                          (  4-1 ) 
 
Here bd is the price sensitivity parameter in the direct channel where 0db >  since 
the two players act as competitors to each other. Intuitively, the demand in the direct 
channel is decreasing in the price in that channel and increasing in the price of the retail 
channel.  
The demand in the retail channel is as follows: 
           ( , ) 1r d r r r dq P P b P P= − + .         (  4-2 ) 
Similarly, here br >0 is the price sensitivity parameter in the retail channel. 
Consumer demand functions imply that the demand in a channel might be positive even 
if the selling price in the other channel is set to zero. This is because there might be 
factors other than prices that affect the consumers’ channel choice, such as product 
availability, lead time etc. that we do not explicitly model.  
At stage 2, for a given wholesale price w from stage 1, the manufacturer’s objective 
is  
max ( , ) ( , )
d
m d d r d r d rP
q P P P q P P wΠ = + . 
 
   Wholesale 
      price, w Retailer
 
Retail channel 
price, Pr 
Direct channel 
Price, Pd 
Consumers 
Retail channel 
demand, qr 
Direct channel 
demand, qd 
STAGE-3 
Manufacturer 
Direct 
Channel
STAGE-2 STAGE-1 
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Because the unit production cost is zero, the manufacturer’s profit margin in the 
direct channel is equal to the direct channel price, dP . And his profit margin for a unit 
sold in the retail channel is equal to the wholesale price w. 
The retailer also aims to maximize her profit. Hence, the retailer’s objective at stage 
2 is 
( )max ( , )
r
r r d r rP
q P P P wΠ = − . 
Here the term ( )rP w−  is the profit margin in the retail channel.  
We solve the three-stage model with backwards induction. First, we determine the 
sales quantity (i.e. the demand) through the direct and the retail channels at stage 3 given 
the pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. Next, we determine the Nash 
equilibrium of the pricing game at stage 2 by defining the manufacturer’s and the 
retailer’s best response functions given a wholesale price w. Finally, we solve for the 
manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price w at stage 1.  
Once we determine the equilibrium *w  as a function of the model parameters bd and 
br, we determine the outcome by solving forward the three stage game. Given *w , we 
determine the Nash equilibrium prices * *( , )d rP P  at stage 2. Then at stage 3, we obtain the 
equilibrium sales quantities * *( , )d rq q  in the channels. Finally, we determine the 
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s equilibrium profits by plugging the values in 
equilibrium into the profit functions.  
The retailer can guess the Nash equilibrium out of the price competition game. 
When she is offered the wholesale price w, she can solve the problem. If * 0rΠ ≥ , the 
retailer accepts the contract, otherwise she rejects the contract and the game ends. Note 
that there is no uncertainty with regard to the parameters bd, br of the problem, and all 
information is common to both firms (i.e. no information asymmetry). Note that the 
reservation profit of the retailer is taken to be equal to 0 without loss of generality.  
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4.1 The Centralized Supply Chain: A Benchmark 
To provide a benchmark, we first consider the centralized case in which there is only 
one decision maker, the centralized firm. The centralized firm owns both the direct and 
the retail channels and he determines the prices, dP  and rP . The profit of the centralized 
firm is the maximum profit that a decentralized supply chain can achieve. 
The centralized firm’ profit function is; 
,
max ( , ) ( , )
dc rc
c dc dc rc dc rc dc rc rcP P
q P P P q P P P∏ = + . 
 The terms dcq  and rcq  denote the quantities sold in the direct and retail channels, 
respectively. They are given as  
                                                                 ( , ) 1 ,dc dc rc d dc rcq P P b P P= − +                                        (  4-3 ) 
                                                                 ( , ) 1 .rc dc rc r r dcq P P b P P= − +                          (  4-4 ) 
First, to obtain the optimal dcP  and rcP  pair, we should show that the profit function 
is jointly concave in dcP  and rcP . This requires the following two conditions
2,  
(1) 
2
2 0
c
dcP
∂ Π <∂ , 
(2) 
2 2 2 2
2 2 0
c c c c
dc rc dc rc rc dcP P P P P P
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π− >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Substituting (4-3) and (4-4), the centralized firm’s profit function becomes 
,
max (1 ) (1 ) .
dc rc
c d dc rc dc r rc dc rcP P
b P P P b P P P∏ = − + + − +  
We determine the second order derivatives as follows: 
                                                 
2 Let 1:F U R→  be a 2 times continuously differentiable or C2 function whose domain is an open set U in 
R1. Suppose that *( ) 0
i
F x
x
∂ =∂
 for i =1,…,n and that the n leading principal minors of D2F(x*) alternate in sign 
2 2 2
22 2
1 2 1 3 1
22 2 2 2
1 2 1
2 22 2
1 1 2 2 3 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 2
2
1 3 2 3 3
0, 0, 0,...
F F F
x x x x xF F
x x xF F F F
x x x x x xF F
x x x F F F
x x x x x
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂< > <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
        
at x*. Then, x* is a strict local maximum of F.  
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2 2 2 2
2 22 , 2 , 2, 2.
c c c c
d r
dc rc dc rc rc dc
b b
P P P P P P
∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π= − = − = =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
Hence, the Hessian becomes3,  
2 2
2 2
d
r
b
b
−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
. 
The first order leading principal minor H(Π) ( , )dc rcP P  is 2 0db− < , satisfying 
condition (1). Condition (2) is satisfied for ( )4 1 0d rb b − > . Therefore, cΠ  is a jointly 
concave function in ( , )dc rcP P  for * 1d rb b > , which we formulate as a formal assumption 
next: 
  
ASSUMPTION 1. The parameters bd and br satisfy * 1d rb b > . 
 
 Intuitively, this assumption requires either bd and br to be large enough. Because if 
both bd and br are small, the centralized firm can make infinite profit by increasing 
dcP and rcP  to infinity. Under Assumption (1) the optimal dcP  and rcP  are found from the 
first order conditions as follows: 
                             *
1 21 2 2 0, ( ) .
2
c rc
d dc rc dc rc
dc d
Pb P P P P
P b
∂∏ += − + = =∂                  (  4-5 ) 
                              *
1 21 2 2 0, ( ) .
2
c dc
r rc dc rc dc
rc r
Pb P P P P
P b
∂∏ += − + = =∂                  (  4-6 )              
By solving these two functions simultaneously, we determine the centralized firm’s 
optimal prices as follows: 
*
*
1( , ) ,
2( 1)
1( , ) .
2( 1)
r
dc d r
r d
d
rc d r
r d
bP b b
b b
bP b b
b b
+= −
+= −
 
Given the prices, we determine the resulting sales quantities from (4-3) and (4-4) as 
follows: 
                                                 
3 The Hessian matrix is the square matrix of the second-order partial derivatives of a function. 
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* 1 ,
2dc
q =             * 1 .
2rc
q =                                             (  4-7 ) 
By substituting, * *( , )dc rcP P , and, 
* *( , )dc rcq q  into the profit function of the centralized 
firm, we obtain the maximum profit in the centralized case as 
* 2( , )
4( 1)
d r
c d r
d r
b bb b
b b
+ +∏ = − . 
4.2     The Analysis 
We solve the game with backwards induction. At stage 3, demand is realized. Next we 
solve stage 2, the pricing game. At this stage, we determine the best responses of the 
manufacturer and the retailer and solve them simultaneously to determine the prices in 
the Nash equilibrium. The manufacturer aims to maximize his profit through the sales in 
the direct channel and the retail channel. Hence, given his w  from stage 1, the 
manufacturer’s objective in stage 2 is  
                  max ( , ) ( , )
d
m d d r d r d rP
q P P P q P P w∏ = + .                           (  4-8 ) 
We substitute (4-1) and (4-2) into (4-8). We observe that the objective function is 
strictly concave in dP . Thus, the first-order-optimality condition is necessary and 
sufficient to find the maximizer of (4-8). The manufacturer’s best response direct 
channel price *dP  is obtained from the first-order condition as a function of rP . 
2
*
21 2 0, 2 0,
m m
r d d d
d d
P w b P b
P P
∂∏ ∂ ∏= + + − = = − <∂ ∂  
                                                               *
1( )
2
r
d r
d
P wP P
b
+ += .                                                         (  4-9 )                        
From (4-9), we observe that when the retailer sets a higher price, the manufacturer 
responds by setting a higher price in the direct channel.  
Next, we solve for the retailer’s problem,   
                                                           ( )max ( , )
r
r r d r r
P
q P P P wΠ = − .                                        (  4-10 ) 
We substitute (4-2) into (4-10). Using the first-order optimality condition, we 
compute the retailer’s best response retail channel price, *rP  as a function of dP , 
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2
*
21 2 0, 2 0,
r r
d r r r r
r r
P wb b P b
P P
∂∏ ∂ ∏= + + − = = − <∂ ∂  
                                    *
1( )
2
d r
r d
r
P wbP P
b
+ += .                                               (  4-11 ) 
We observe that when the manufacturer sets a higher price in the direct channel, the 
retailer responds by setting a higher price in the retail channel.   
We determine the Nash Equilibrium, * *( , )d rP P  by solving (4-9) and (4-11) 
simultaneously under Assumption (1). We determine the prices in equilibrium as 
follows:   
                                             *
1 (2 3 )( ) ,
1 4
r
d
d r
b wP w
b b
+ += − +                                                    (  4-12 ) 
                                       *
1 2 (1 )( )
1 4
d r
r
d r
w b b wP w
b b
+ + += − + .                                           (  4-13 ) 
Given *dP  and 
*
rP  as a function of w , the sales quantities are obtained as 
* 2( )
4 1
d d r d r
d
d r
b b b w b b wq w
b b
+ + −= − , 
[ ]* 1 2 2 (1 )( )
4 1
r d r
r
d r
b w b b w
q w
b b
+ + −= − . 
At stage 1, we substitute the *dq , 
*
rq  and 
*
dP , 
*
rP values in (4-8) and (4-10) to 
determine the profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer as a function of w, 
2 2 2 2
2
8 ( 1 ) (1 ) (1 4 (4 8 7 ))( )
(1 4 )
d r r r r d r r
m
d r
b b w b w w b b w b b b w ww
b b
− − + + + + + + + + +∏ = − .  (  4-14 ) 
2
2
(1 2 (2 2 ))( )
(1 4 )
r d r
r
d r
b w b b ww
b b
+ + −∏ = − . 
The total profit of the supply chain as a function of w  is denoted by t d−∏  and 
determined as follows: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
5 5 (4 4 ) (1 8 (1 ) (4 4 ))( )
(1 4 )
r r r d r r d r r
t d
d r
b w b w b w b b b w b b w b w ww
b b−
+ + + + − + + + + + −∏ = −
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The manufacturer will determine the optimal wholesale price *w  to maximize his 
profit from (4-14) which is concave in w. From the first order condition, we obtain *w  as 
                                 
2
*
2 2
1 8 (1 )
2 ( 1 7 8 )
r d d r
r d r d r
b b b bw
b b b b b
+ + += − − + .                                               
Given this *w , we determine the equilibrium sales prices from (4-12) and (4-13) as 
follows: 
2
*
2 2
1 10 8( , )
2( 1 7 8 )
r d r d r
d d r
d r d r
b b b b bP b b
b b b b
− + + += − − + . 
2
*
2 2
1 2 4 (2 3 )( , )
2 ( 1 7 8 )
r d r d d r
r d r
r d r d r
b b b b b bP b b
b b b b b
− + − + += − − + . 
For these equilibrium prices, we determine the sales quantities in equilibrium as 
follows: 
* 1 2( , )
1 8
d r
r d r
d r
b bq b b
b b
+= + , 
2
*
2
1 2 8( , )
2 16
r d r d r
d d r
r d r
b b b b bq b b
b b b
+ + += + . 
Given these equilibrium values, we obtain the equilibrium profits of the direct 
channel, retail channel and total supply chain for a given bd  and br  as follows: 
                  
2 2 3
2 2
1 (2 4 ) (1 16 4 ) 8( , )
4 ( 1 7 8 )
d r d d r d r
d rm
r d r d r
b b b b b b bb b
b b b b b
+ + + + + += − − +∏ .                   
                                           
2
2
(1 2 )( , )
(1 8 )
d r
d rr
r d r
b bb b
b b b
+= +∏ .                                       
2 2 2 3 2 4
2
3 2 (1 32 36 ) 16 (1 8 3 ) 64( , )
4 ( 1 )(1 8 )
r d d r d d d r d r
d rt d
r d r d r
b b b b b b b b b bb b
b b b b b−
− + + + + + + + += − + +∏ .  
Comparing the centralized and decentralized scenarios, we determine that the 
supply chain could achieve the maximum profit when the firms act as an integrated firm 
(centralized case).  
Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interactions among 
independent rational players produce best responses with respect to preferences (or 
utilities) of those players, none of which might have been intended by any of them. 
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Although behaving as a centralized firm would give each firm (the manufacturer and the 
retailer) a better payoff (better profit), self-interest leads to an inefficient outcome with 
less payoff (less profit).  
4.3 Comparative Statics with Respect to the Price Sensitivity Parameters 
In this section, we study the effects of the price sensitivity parameters bd and br on the 
equilibrium outcome of both the centralized and the decentralized cases. Recall that a 
high price sensitivity parameter makes the channel’s customers more sensitive to the 
sales price in that channel. 
4.3.1 Comparative Statics in the Centralized Case 
Here we analyze the effects of the price sensitivity parameters bd and br in optimal 
prices, sales quantities and profit in the centralized case we analyzed in Section 4.1. 
There is no wholesale price in this case, because there is no need to contract.  
4.3.1.1 Comparative Statics with Respect to bd 
We analyze the changes in the decision variables *dcP , 
*
rcP , and the outcome 
*
dcq , 
*
rcq  and 
*
cΠ  with respect to changes in bd. From (4-15), we observe that when customers become 
more price sensitive in the direct channel (i.e., when bd increases), the centralized firm 
reduces the selling price to keep the direct channel customers.  
*
2
(1 ) 0.
2( 1 )
dc r r
d d r
P b b
b b b
∂ += − <− +                                               (  4-15 ) 
From (4-16), we observe that when customers become more price sensitive in the 
direct channel, the centralized firm decreases his retail channel price as well. From (4-6), 
the optimal *rcP  given Pdc is 
* 1 2( )
2
dc
rc dc
r
PP P
b
+= . From (4-15), *dcP  is decreasing in bd . 
Hence, if the centralized firm changes *dcP  because of a change in bd, the firm also 
changes *rcP  accordingly.  
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*
2
1 0.
2( 1 )
rc r
d d r
P b
b b b
∂ += − <− +                                             (  4-16 ) 
Next we consider the optimal sales quantities of the centralized firm in the two 
channels. From (4-7), the centralized firm reaches his optimal profit when he sells 0.5 
units in each channel. This implies that the firm balances the changes in the decision 
variables of the sales quantity equations. Recall that we have * * *1dc d dc rcq b P P= − + . From 
(4-16), *rcP  is decreasing in bd. From (4-17), the term 
*( )d dcb P  is decreasing in bd as well. 
The decreases in the term *( )d dcb P  and in 
*
rcP  cancel each other and consequently, the 
centralized firm’s optimal sales quantity in the direct channel continues to be equal to 
0.5 independent of the changes in bd.  
                                       
*
2
( ) 1 0.
2( 1 )
d dc r
d d r
b P b
b b b
∂ += − <∂ − +                                    (  4-17 )                       
Similarly, we have * * *1rc r rc dcq b P P= − + . From (4-15), *dcP  is decreasing in bd. From    
(4-18), the term *( )r rcb P  is also decreasing in bd. The decreases in the term 
*( )r rcb P  and in 
*
dcP  cancel each other and hence, the centralized firm’s optimal sales quantity in the 
retail channel continues to be 0.5 independent of the changes in bd. 
 
*
2
( ) (1 ) 0.
2( 1 )
r rc r r
d d r
b P b b
b b b
∂ += − <− +                                (  4-18 )                        
Recall that * * * * *c dc dc rc rcq P q PΠ = + . The optimum price values *dcP  and *rcP  are 
decreasing in bd. The  optimal sales quantities are constant at 0.5. Thus, the centralized 
firm’s optimal profit is decreasing in bd. This is confirmed by (4-19), which illustrates 
the changes in *cΠ  with respect to bd.  
* 2
2
(1 ) 0.
4( 1 )
c r
d d r
b
b b b
∂Π += − <∂ − +                                            (  4-19 )                        
4.3.1.2 Comparative Statics with Respect to br 
From (4-20), we observe that the central firm decreases the optimum sales price in 
the retail channel *rcP  if the price sensitivity parameter in the retail channel increases. In 
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this case, the customers become more price sensitive and the central firm has to reduce 
price to keep the retail channel’s customers.   
*
2
(1 ) 0.
2( 1 )
rc d d
r d r
P b b
b b b
∂ += − <∂ − +                                               (  4-20 ) 
From (4-21), we observe the optimal direct channel price, *dcP  is also decreasing in 
br. From (4-5), the optimal *dcP  as a function of rcP  is 
* 1 2( )
2
rc
dc rc
d
PP P
b
+= . An increase in 
br leads to a decrease in rcP  from (4-20), which in turn leads to a decrease in 
*
dcP .  
 
*
2
1 0.
2( 1 )
dc d
r d r
P b
b b b
∂ += − <∂ − +                                        (  4-21 )                        
Next we consider the optimal sales quantities. As we observe from (4-7), the 
optimum sales quantities are both equal to 0.5 independent of the changes in br. Recall 
that * * *1dc d dc rcq b P P= − + . From (4-20), *rcP  is decreasing in br. From (4-22), the term 
*( )d dcb P  is also decreasing in br.. The decreases in 
*
rcP  and in 
*( )d dcb P  cancel each other 
and the centralized firm’s optimum sales quantity in the direct channel stays constant at 
0.5 independent of the changes in br. 
*
2
( ) (1 ) 0.
2( 1 )
d dc d d
r d r
b P b b
b b b
∂ += − <∂ − +                                (  4-22 )                       
Similarly, * * *1rc r rc dcq b P P= − + . From (4-21), *dcP  is decreasing in br. From (4-23), the 
term *( )r rcb P  is also decreasing in br. The decreases in 
*
dcP  and in 
*( )r rcb P  cancel each 
other and the centralized firm’s optimal sales quantity in the retail channel stays constant 
at 0.5 independent of the changes in br. 
*
2
( ) 1 0.
2( 1 )
r rc d
r d r
b P b
b b b
∂ += − <∂ − +                                (  4-23 )                        
Recall that * * * * *c dc dc rc rcq P q PΠ = + . From (4-20) and (4-21), the optimum price values 
*
rcP  and 
*
dcP  are decreasing in br. The optimal sales quantities are constant at 0.5. Thus, 
the centralized firm’s optimal profit is decreasing in br. This is confirmed by (4-24), 
which illustrates the changes in *cΠ  with respect to br.      
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* 2
2
(1 ) 0.
4( 1 )
c d
r d r
b
b b b
∂∏ += − <∂ − +                                      (  4-24 )           
4.3.2 Comparative Statics in the Decentralized Case 
Here we analyze the effects of the price sensitivity parameters bd and br in equilibrium 
prices, sales quantities and profit in the decentralized case that we analyzed in Section 
4.2. 
4.3.2.1 Comperative Statics with Respect to bd 
From (4-25), we observe that the equilibrium direct channel price *dP  is decreasing in bd. 
That is, the manufacturer sets a lower selling price in the direct channel if that channel’s 
customers become more price sensitive.  
                   
* 2 2 3
2 2 2
(17 16 16 (1 5 ) 64 ) 0.
2(1 7 8 )
d r r d r d d r d r
d d r d r
P b b b b b b b b b
b b b b b
∂ + − + + += − <∂ + −                  (  4-25 ) 
From (4-26), the equilibrium retail channel price *rP  is also decreasing in bd. Recall 
that bd does not have a direct effect in the retailer’s demand function. However, the sales 
prices in the channels are determined as the equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game. 
From (4-11), we know that * 1( )
2
d r
r d
r
P wbP P
b
+ +=  and from (4-25), we know that *dP  is 
decreasing in bd. Thus, when bd increases, the retailer reduces the price in her channel 
because the manufacturer reduces the direct channel price. This illustrates the 
equilibrium dynamics of the model we consider.  
                  
2 2 3*
2 2 2
5 8 4 (4 17 ) 64 0.
2(1 7 8 )
r d r d d r d rr
d d r d r
b b b b b b b bP
b b b b b
+ + + + +∂ = − <∂ + −                            (  4-26 ) 
Next, we consider how changes in bd affect the manufacturer’s wholesale price 
choice in stage 1. From (4-27), we observe that w* is decreasing in bd. We know from 
(4-26) that the retail channel’s price *rP  is decreasing in bd. Hence, if bd increases, the 
manufacturer reduces the wholesale price to support the retailer. Otherwise the retailer 
would not accept the contract and the manufacturer would lose one of his channels.  
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2 2 3*
2 2 2
7 32 8 (2 7 ) 64 0.
2(1 7 8 )
r d r d d r d r
d d r d r
b b b b b b b bw
b b b b b
− + + + + +∂ = − <∂ + −                        (  4-27 ) 
Having determined the effect of bd in channels’ prices, we consider the effects in the 
sales quantities.  From (4-28), we observe that the equilibrium sales quantity in the 
direct channel is decreasing in bd. Recall that * * *1d d d rq b P P= − + . From (4-29), the term 
*( )d db P  is decreasing in bd. It appears that the change in 
*
rP  dominates the change in 
*( )d db P  and hence 
*
dq  is decreasing in bd. Although the manufacturer reduces the direct 
channel price, he cannot totally prevent the migration of customers from that channel 
due to the increase in price sensitivity, because the retailer also reduces her price.  
*
2
3 0
(1 8 )
d
d d r
q
b b b
∂ = − <∂ + ;  
2 *
3
48 0.
(1 8 )
d r
d d r
q b
b b b
∂ = >∂ +                                  (  4-28 )          
 
      
* 2 2 3
2 2 2
( ) 1 20 2 (8 31 ) 64 0.
2(1 7 8 )
d d r d r d d r d r
d d r d r
b P b b b b b b b b
b b b b b
∂ − + + + + += − <∂ + −                             (  4-29 ) 
From (4-30), we observe that the equilibrium sales quantity in the retail channel is 
also decreasing in bd. One expects that when the direct channel customers become more 
price-sensitive, and when the retail channel price decreases, the demand in the retail 
channel will increase. However, the retail channel sales decrease because the direct 
channel price also decreases.  
                                                                  
*
2
6 0.
(1 8 )
r r
d d r
q b
b b b
∂ = − <∂ +                                           (  4-30 ) 
Next we consider the changes in profits. From (4-31), the manufacturer’s 
equilibrium profit is decreasing in bd. This is expected because we have 
* * * * *
m d d rq P q wΠ = +  and all *dq , *dP , *rq  and *w are decreasing in bd.  
* 2 2 3 2 4
2 2 2
3 (2 24 ) (1 32 60 ) 16 (1 8 ) 64 0.
4(1 7 8 )
m d r d d r d d r d r
d d r d r
b b b b b b b b b b
b b b b b
∂Π − + + + + + + + += − <∂ + −  (  4-31 ) 
From (4-32), the retailer’s equilibrium profit is also decreasing in bd. This is not as 
expected as the effect on the manufacturer’s profit. We have * * * *( )r r rq P wΠ = −  and all 
*
rq , 
*
rP  and w
* are decreasing in bd. It appears that the changes in *rq  and 
*
rP  dominate 
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the change in *w  and hence the retailer’s profit is decreasing in bd. Thus, the 
manufacturer’s support by reducing the wholesale price does not prevent the reduction 
in the retailer’s profit.  
*
3
12(1 2 ) 0.
(1 8 )
d rr
d d r
b b
b b b
+∂Π = − <∂ +                             (  4-32 ) 
From (4-33), the equilibrium total channel profit is seen to be decreasing in bd. This 
is expected as both firm’s profits are decreasing in bd.  
* 2 2 2 3 2 4 3 5
2 3
45 2 (1 48 108 ) 24 (1 16 24 ) 64 (3 16 ) 512 0.
4( 1 ) (1 8 )
t d r d d r d d d r d d r d r
d d r d r
b b b b b b b b b b b b b
b b b b b
−∂Π + + + + + + + + + += − <∂ − + +
                                             (  4-33 ) 
4.3.2.2 Comperative Statics with respect to br 
From (4-34), we observe that the equilibrium retail channel price *rP  is decreasing in br. 
That is, the retailer sets a lower selling price in the retail channel if that channel’s 
customers become more price sensitive. 
4 4 3 3 2 2*
2 2 2 2
1 96 (14 ) 32 ( 1 2 ) 2 (1 8 ) 0.
2 (1 7 8 )
d r d r r d r r d r rr
r r d r d r
b b b b b b b b b b bP
b b b b b b
+ + + + − + + +∂ = − <∂ + −   (  4-34 ) 
From (4-35), the equilibrium direct channel price is also decreasing in br. 
Remember that br does not affect the direct channel’s demand directly. However, we 
determine the sales prices in the channels as the equilibrium of a simultaneous-move 
game. From (4-9), we know that * 1( )
2
r
d r
d
P wP P
b
+ +=  and from (4-34), we know that *rP  
is decreasing in br. Thus, when br increases, the manufacturer reduces the price in his 
channel because the retailer reduces the retail channel price. This again illustrates the 
equilibrium dynamics of the model we consider. 
                             
* 3 2 2
2 2 2
1 80 16 ( 1 4 ) (17 16 ) 0.
2(1 7 8 )
d d r d r r d r
r d r d r
P b b b b b b b
b b b b b
∂ + + − + + += − <∂ + −           (  4-35 ) 
Next, we consider how the manufacturer’s wholesale price choice in stage 1 is 
affected. From (4-36), we observe that *w  is decreasing in br. From (4-34), we know 
that the retail channel’s equilibrium price *rP  is decreasing in br. Hence, if br increases, 
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the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price to support the retailer. Otherwise, the 
manufacturer may lose one of his channels if the retailer refuses the contract.  
            
3 4 4 4 2 2*
2 2 2 2
1 ( 14 ) 64 64 16 (2 ) 0.
2 (1 7 8 )
d r r d r d r d r r
r r d r d r
b b b b b b b b b bw
b b b b b b
− + − + + + + +∂ = − <∂ + −            (  4-36 ) 
After we determine the effect of br in channels’ prices, we consider the effects in the 
sales quantities. From (4-37), we observe that the equilibrium sales quantity in the retail 
channel is decreasing in br. Recall that * * *1r r r dq b P P= − + . From (4-38), we observe that 
the term *( )r rb P  is decreasing in br. However, the change in 
*
dP  dominates the change in 
*( )r rb P  and hence 
*
rq  is decreasing in br. Although the retailer reduces her retail channel 
price, some customers migrate from the retail channel due to the increase in price 
sensitivity. 
*
2
6 0.
(1 8 )
dr
r d r
bq
b b b
∂ = − <∂ +                                                    (  4-37)        
3 2 2*
2 2 2
1 68 8 (1 8 ) (5 16 )( ) 0.
2(1 7 8 )
d r d r r d rr r
r d r d r
b b b b b b bb P
b b b b b
+ + + + +∂ = − <∂ + −             (  4-38 ) 
From (4-39), we observe that the equilibrium sales quantity in the direct channel is 
also decreasing in br. One may think that when the retail channel customers become 
more price-sensitive, and when the direct channel price decreases, the direct channel 
demand will increase. However, the direct channel sales decrease, because the retail 
channel price also decreases.  
                                                          
* 2 2
2 2
1 16 16 0.
2 (1 8 )
d d r d r
r r d r
q b b b b
b b b b
∂ + += − <∂ +                                     (  4-39 ) 
Next, we consider the changes in profits. From (4-40), the retailer’s equilibrium 
profit is decreasing in br. We have * * * *( )r r rq P wΠ = −  and all *rq , *rP  and w* are 
decreasing in br. It appears that the changes in *rq  and 
*
rP  dominate the change in 
*w  
and hence the retailer’s profit is decreasing in br. Although the manufacturer supports 
the retailer by reducing the wholesale price, this decrease does not prevent the reduction 
in the retailer’s profit.  
                                        
2 2 3 3*
2 3
1 24 60 32 0.
(1 8 )
d r d r d rr
r r d r
b b b b b b
b b b b
+ + +∂Π = − <∂ +                        (  4-40 ) 
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From (4-41), the manufacturer’s profit is decreasing in br. This is expected because 
we have * * * * *m d d rq P q wΠ = +  and all *dq , *dP , *rq  and *w are decreasing in br.  
* 2 4 4 2 3 3 3 2
2 2 2 2
1 32 32 (1 2 ) 64 (1 2 ) 2 ( 7 8 ) 0.
4 (1 7 8 )
m r d r d r r d r r d r r r
r r d r d r
b b b b b b b b b b b b b
b b b b b b
∂Π − + + + + + + + − + += − <∂ + −  
( 4-41 ) 
 From (4-42), the equilibrium total channel profit is seen to be decreasing in br. This 
is because both firm’s profits are decreasing in br.  
* 2 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 3
3 384 16 (33 64 ) 64 ( 3 6 8 ) 2 (33 12 ) 12 ( 5 4 16 ) 0.
4 ( 1 ) (1 8 )
t d r d r d r r d r r r d r r r d r r r
r r d r d r
b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
b b b b b b
−∂Π + + + + + − + + + + + + − + += − <∂ − + +
 (  4-42 ) 
4.4 Comparing the Decentralized and the Centralized Cases 
Here we compare the results from the decentralized and centralized cases to understand 
the effects of decentralization. In general, a centralized system is known to be more 
efficient than a decentralized system because of the incentive conflicts in a 
decentralized system. In our decentralized case, the prices are determined as the 
outcome of a simultaneous-move game in which both firms are trying to maximize their 
own profit without considering the effect of their decision on the other firm’s profit. In 
the centralized case, a single decision maker, the centralized firm, determines the prices 
to maximize the total profit of the channels. In Section 4.5, we illustrate some of the 
discussions in this section through a numerical example.  
 
 
Figure  4-2: The Retail Channel Prices in the Centralized and Decentralized Cases 
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Figure  4-2 compares the retail channel prices in the centralized and decentralized 
cases. We observe that for each value of bd and br, the decentralized case has a higher 
retail channel price than the centralized case. We also confirmed this observation by 
using the FindInstance function of Mathematica. Figure  4-3 shows the difference 
* *( )r rcP P− , which is always positive. 
 
 
Figure  4-3: The Difference in *rP  Between Decentralized and Centralized Cases 
 
*
rP  in the decentralized case is higher because in this case, the retailer’s profit 
margin is constrained by the wholesale price w. That is, in the decentralized case, both 
the manufacturer and the retailer should make a profit out of every sale in the retail 
channel. In the centralized case, only the centralized firm needs to make a profit, and 
hence, the firm can afford to set a lower sales price. Figure  4-3 illustrates the difference 
* *( )r rcP P− . We observe that the difference is quickly decreasing in br, whereas it is 
decreasing very slowly in bd. The decrease is so small that it is not apparent in the figure.  
Note that in both centralized and decentralized cases, *rP  decreases when bd and/or 
br increases (Figure 4-2). The parameter br affects *rP  directly due to the demand 
function * * *1r r r dq b P P= − + . On the other hand, the parameter bd affects *rP  through its 
effect on *dP , as we discussed in Section 4.2.  
The difference between the decentralized and centralized cases is related to the well-
known “double marginalization” issue. As shown in Figure  4-4, the total profit margin 
in the decentralized case is shared between the manufacturer and the retailer. Each firm 
considers only his/her own profit margin when making decisions, which leads to channel 
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inefficiency. As a result, consumers are charged a higher retail channel price than in the 
centralized case. As we discuss in subsequent sections, double marginalization also leads 
to inefficiencies in other performance measures including the total channel profit.  
 
            
Figure  4-4: Double Marginalization 
 
Figure  4-5 compares the direct channel prices. Although it is not apparent from the 
figure, the direct channel price in the decentralized case is always higher than the price 
in the centralized case. We confirmed this observation with Mathematica as well. Figure 
 4-6 illustrates the difference * *( )d dcP P− , which is always positive.  
 
 
Figure  4-5: The Direct Channel Prices in Centralized and Decentralized Cases 
 
The direct channel price in the decentralized case is higher because the prices in the 
decentralized case are determined through an equilibrium analysis. The higher retail 
channel price in the decentralized case (as discussed in Section 4.3.2) cause a higher 
direct channel price as well.  
Production cost=0 Pr 
w    Retailer’s profit margin 
    Manufacturer’s
     profit margin 
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Figure  4-6: The Difference in *dP  Between Decentralized and Centralized Cases 
 
Note from Figure  4-5 that in both centralized and decentralized cases, *dP  decreases 
when bd and/or br increases. The parameter bd affects *dP  directly due to the demand 
function * * *1d d d rq b P P= − + . On the other hand, the parameter br affects *dP  through its 
effect on *rP , as we discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.  
The direct channel’s price difference between the two cases, * *( )d dcP P−  (Figure  4-6) 
is smaller than the difference in the retail channel prices between two cases, * *( )r rcP P−  
(Figure  4-3). This is because the owner of the direct channel for both cases is the 
manufacturer; it does not change. However, the owner of the retail channel changes: The 
owner is the centralized firm in the centralized scenario, whereas the owner is the 
retailer in the decentralized scenario. This change in ownership causes changes in profit 
margins.  
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Figure  4-7: The Retail Channel Sales Quantities in Centralized and Decentralized Cases 
 
Figure  4-7 compares the equilibrium retail channel sales quantities as a function of 
bd and br. We observe that the quantity sold in the decentralized case is always lower 
than the quantity sold in the centralized case. This is confirmed by Figure  4-8 which 
illustrates the difference * *( )r rcq q−  as being always negative.  
 
 
Figure  4-8: The Difference in *rq Between Decentralized and Centralized Cases 
 
The retail channel sales quantity is lower in the decentralized case because the retail 
channel price is significantly higher in the decentralized case, as discussed before. The 
direct channel price is higher in the decentralized case as well, but this effect is 
dominated by the retail channel price’s effect. This decrease in sales quantity is another 
inefficiency that double marginalization causes. The customers purchase less than the 
system-optimal sales quantity. 
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Figure  4-9: The Direct Channel Sales Quantities in Centralized and Decentralized Cases 
 
From Figure  4-9, we observe that the equilibrium direct channel sales quantity in 
the decentralized case is higher than the quantity in the centralized case for all values of 
bd and br. Compare this with the equilibrium retail channel sales quantity which was 
higher in the centralized case. Figure  4-10 presents the difference * *( )d dcq q−  which is 
always positive. 
 
 
Figure  4-10: The Difference in *dq  Between Decentralized and Centralized Cases 
 
As mentioned before, the increase in the direct channel price is less than the 
increase in the retail channel price when moving from the centralized case to the 
decentralized case. This results in migration of some retail channel customers to the 
direct channel.  
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We know that the retail channel sales are higher in the centralized case whereas the 
direct channel sales are higher in the decentralized case. Next, we compare the total 
quantities sold in the centralized and the decentralized cases. The difference between the 
equilibrium total sales in the centralized case ( *t cq − ) and the equilibrium total sales in the 
decentralized case ( *t dq − ) is given in (4-43). The term is  
                                             
2
* *
2
1 2 4
2 16
r d r d r
t d t c
r d r
b b b b bq q
b b b− −
+ + −− = +                                              (  4-43 ) 
From (4-43), we determine that * *( )t d t cq q− −>  if  ( 1db >  and 'r rb b< ) whereas 
* *( )t d t cq q− −≤  if ( 1db ≤ ) or ( 1db >  and 'r rb b≥ ) where 
2
'
2
1 2 1 20 41
8 8
d d d
r
d d
b b bb
b b
+ + += + . 
The difference in total sales quantities is illustrated by Figure  4-11.  
 
 
Figure  4-11: The Difference in Total Sales Quantities Between Decentralized and 
Centralized  Cases  
 
Next, we compare the total profits. Figure  4-12 illustrates that the total profit in the 
centralized case *( )t cPi −  is always higher than the total profit in the decentralized case 
*( )t cPi − . This is due to double marginalization. We can also show this result analytically. 
* *( )t d t cPi Pi− −<  if   
2 2 2 3 2 4
2
3 2 (1 32 36 ) 16 (1 8 3 ) 64 2
4 ( 1 )(1 8 ) 4( 1)
r d d r d d d r d r d r
r d r d r d r
b b b b b b b b b b b b
b b b b b b b
− + + + + + + + + + +<− + + −  
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This inequality holds for ( ) ( ) ?2 2 24 1 3 4 16 0r d r d r db b b b b b⎡ ⎤− − + − − + <⎣ ⎦ . Under the 
assumptions * 1r db b > ; 0db >  and 0rb > , this is always true.  
 
 
Figure  4-12: The Difference in Total Channel Profits Between Decentralized and 
Centralized Cases  
4.5 Numerical Example for Comparing the Decentralized and the Centralized 
Cases  
Here, we illustrate the comparative statics observations through a numerical example. 
First, we provide the results for the centralized benchmark case.  
Table  4-1 illustrates how the results change when only bd increases, when only br 
increases and when both bd and br increase. Note that we consider the constraint 
* 1r db b >  in selecting the parameter values. We observe how the centralized firm’s 
prices (decision variables) and resulting profit decrease when bd  and/or br  increases. On 
the other hand, the sales quantities remain constant at 0.5 
 
Table  4-1: Numerical Example for the Comparative Statics of the Centralized Case 
bd br Pdc Prc qdc qrc
Centralized
Firm's Profit
1 5 0,7500 0,2500 0,5000 0,5000 0,5000
2 5 0,3333 0,1667 0,5000 0,5000 0,2500
3 5 0,2143 0,1429 0,5000 0,5000 0,1786
4 5 0,1579 0,1316 0,5000 0,5000 0,1447
5 5 0,1250 0,1250 0,5000 0,5000 0,1250
THE CENTRALIZED CASE
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bd br Pdc Prc qdc qrc
Centralized
Firm's Profit
5 1 0,2500 0,7500 0,5000 0,5000 0,5000
5 2 0,1667 0,3333 0,5000 0,5000 0,2500
5 3 0,1429 0,2143 0,5000 0,5000 0,1786
5 4 0,1316 0,1579 0,5000 0,5000 0,1447
5 5 0,1250 0,1250 0,5000 0,5000 0,1250  
bd br Pdc Prc qdc qrc
Centralized
Firm's Profit
1,1 1,1 5,0000 5,0000 0,5000 0,5000 5,0000
2 2 0,5000 0,5000 0,5000 0,5000 0,5000
3 3 0,2500 0,2500 0,5000 0,5000 0,2500
4 4 0,1667 0,1667 0,5000 0,5000 0,1667
5 5 0,1250 0,1250 0,5000 0,5000 0,1250  
  
Table 4-2 provides the results for the decentralized case. As discussed before, we 
observe that the prices, sales quantities, wholesale price and profit values in equilibrium 
all decrease when bd and/or br increases.    
 
Table  4-2: Numerical Example for the Comparative Statics of the Decentralized Case 
 
bd br Pd Pr qd qr w
Manufacturer's
Profit
Retailer's
Profit
Total
Profit
1 5 0,7744 0,3012 0,5268 0,2683 0,2476 0,4744 0,0144 0,4888
2 5 0,3457 0,2173 0,5259 0,2593 0,1654 0,2247 0,0134 0,2381
3 5 0,2226 0,1933 0,5256 0,2562 0,1420 0,1534 0,0131 0,1665
4 5 0,1641 0,1819 0,5255 0,2547 0,1310 0,1196 0,0130 0,1326
5 5 0,1300 0,1752 0,5254 0,2537 0,1245 0,0999 0,0129 0,1128
THE DECENTRALIZED CASE
 
 
bd br Pd Pr qd qr w
Manufacturer's
Profit
Retailer's
Profit
Total
Profit
5 1 0,2744 1,0061 0,6341 0,2683 0,7378 0,3720 0,0720 0,4439
5 2 0,1790 0,4599 0,5648 0,2593 0,3302 0,1867 0,0336 0,2203
5 3 0,1511 0,2983 0,5427 0,2562 0,2129 0,1366 0,0219 0,1584
5 4 0,1378 0,2208 0,5318 0,2547 0,1571 0,1133 0,0162 0,1295
5 5 0,1300 0,1752 0,5254 0,2537 0,1245 0,0999 0,0129 0,1128  
 
bd br Pd Pr qd qr w
Manufacturer's
Profit
Retailer's
Profit
Total
Profit
1,1 1,1 5,0936 5,2486 0,6456 0,3202 4,9574 4,8757 0,0932 4,9689
2 2 0,5303 0,6288 0,5682 0,2727 0,4924 0,4356 0,0372 0,4728
3 3 0,2637 0,3345 0,5434 0,2603 0,2477 0,2078 0,0226 0,2303
4 4 0,1744 0,2297 0,5320 0,2558 0,1657 0,1352 0,0164 0,1515
5 5 0,1300 0,1752 0,5254 0,2537 0,1245 0,0999 0,0129 0,1128  
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Table  4-3 illustrates the difference between the results in the decentralized and 
centralized cases when bd and/or br increases. We observe that the difference in prices, 
quantities, and profits (in absolute terms) decrease as bd and/or br increases.  
 
Table  4-3: Numerical Example for the Comparison of the Decentralized and the 
Centralized Cases 
bd br Pd-Pdc Pr-Prc qd-qdc qr-qrc qt-d-qt-c
Difference in
 Total Profit
(Decentralized-
Centralized)
1 5 0,0244 0,0512 0,0268 -0,2317 -0,2049 -0,01121
2 5 0,0123 0,0506 0,0259 -0,2407 -0,2148 -0,01187
3 5 0,0083 0,0504 0,0256 -0,2438 -0,2182 -0,01208
4 5 0,0062 0,0503 0,0255 -0,2453 -0,2199 -0,01219
5 5 0,0050 0,0502 0,0254 -0,2463 -0,2209 -0,01225
Comparing the Decentralized and Centralized Cases
 
bd br Pd-Pdc Pr-Prc qd-qdc qr-qrc qt-d-qt-c
Difference in
 Total Profit
(Decentralized-
Centralized)
5 1 0,0244 0,2561 0,1341 -0,2317 -0,0976 -0,05607
5 2 0,0123 0,1265 0,0648 -0,2407 -0,1759 -0,02966
5 3 0,0083 0,0840 0,0427 -0,2438 -0,2011 -0,02013
5 4 0,0062 0,0629 0,0318 -0,2453 -0,2135 -0,01523
5 5 0,0050 0,0502 0,0254 -0,2463 -0,2209 -0,01225
bd br Pd-Pdc Pr-Prc qd-qdc qr-qrc qt-d-qt-c
Difference in
 Total Profit
(Decentralized-
Centralized)
1,1 1,1 0,0936 0,2486 0,1456 -0,1798 -0,0342 -0,03105
2 2 0,0303 0,1288 0,0682 -0,2273 -0,1591 -0,02720
3 3 0,0137 0,0845 0,0434 -0,2397 -0,1963 -0,01966
4 4 0,0078 0,0630 0,0320 -0,2442 -0,2122 -0,01513
5 5 0,0050 0,0502 0,0254 -0,2463 -0,2209 -0,01225  
4.6 Single-Channel Scenarios 
In this section, we study the models with only a single channel.  
4.6.1 The Direct Channel - Only Scenario 
In this scenario, we consider a manufacturer selling his products only through his direct 
channel.  The model is similar to the dual channel model of Section 4, with the 
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exception that there is no retail channel, as illustrated in Figure  4-13. Because there is 
no retailer, the model does not specify a wholesale price. 
 
 
Figure  4-13: The Direct Channel - Only Scenario 
  
The demand in the direct channel depends on the sales price dP  as follows: 
( ) 1d d d dq P b P= − .                                                      (  4-44 ) 
The manufacturer aims to maximize his profit. Hence, the manufacturer’s objective 
is 
                                                                      max ( ) .
d
m d d dP
q P PΠ =                                              (  4-45 ) 
By substituting (4-44) into (4-45), we observe that the objective function is strictly 
concave in dP . Thus, the first-order-optimality condition is necessary and sufficient to 
find the maximizer. The manufacturer’s optimal direct channel price, *dP  is obtained 
from the first-order condition as * 1( )
2d d d
P b
b
= . 
We observe that when the consumers in the direct channel become more price 
sensitive, the manufacturer responds by decreasing his price. Substituting the optimal 
price into (4-44), we determine the optimal sales quantity as  
* 1( )
2d d
q b = . 
Substituting *dq  and 
*
dP  values into (4-45), we determine the optimal profit of the 
manufacturer as 
* 1( )
4m d d
b
b
∏ = . 
When the consumers in the direct channel become more price sensitive, the 
manufacturer’s profit decreases although he decreases his selling price. However, the 
sales quantity does not change, because it is independent of bd.  
Direct 
Channel 
Direct channel 
demand, qd 
Manufacturer Consumers 
Direct channel 
price, Pd 
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4.6.2 The Retail Channel - Only Scenario 
In this scenario, we consider a manufacturer selling his product only through an 
independent retailer. The model is similar to the dual channel model of Section 4, with 
the exception that there is no direct channel. This model allows us to focus only on the 
effects of double marginalization without the complicating effects of a dual channel 
strategy.  
 
Figure  4-14: The Retail Channel - Only Scenario 
 
The demand in the retail channel depends on the price rP  as follows: 
                                                                   ( ) 1r r r rq P b P= − .                                                        (  4-46 ) 
The retailer’s objective given the wholesale price w is 
                                                               ( )max ( )
r
r r r rP
q P P w∏ = − .                                          (  4-47 )                      
Substituting (4-46) into (4-47), we observe that the objective function is strictly 
concave in rP . Thus, the first-order-optimality condition is necessary and sufficient to 
find the maximizer. The retail channel optimal price, *rP  is obtained from the first-order 
condition as * 1( )
2
r
r
r
wbP w
b
+= . 
We observe that when the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price w, the retailer 
responds by setting a higher sales price to increase her profit. Substituting *rP  into       
(4-46), we obtain * 1( )
2
r
r
wbq w −= .  
The manufacturer’s objective function is  
                                      max ( )m r rq P wΠ = .                                          (  4-48 )       
Next, substituting *rq  and 
*
rP values as a function of w into (4-47) and (4-48), we 
determine the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer as a function of w. 
Wholesale 
price, w 
Retailer
Retail channel 
price, Pr 
Retail channel 
demand, qr 
Manufacturer Consumers 
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                                                   *
(1 )( )
2
r
m
wbw w −∏ = .                                            (  4-49 ) 
2
* ( 1 )( )
4
r
r
r
b ww
b
− +∏ = .                                  
The manufacturer will determine the optimal wholesale price *w  to maximize his 
profit in (4-49), which is concave in w and the optimal *w  is obtained from the first-
order condition as * 1
2 r
w
b
= . Given this wholesale price, the retailer’s price would be 
* 3( )
4r r r
P b
b
= . 
Given the optimal retail channel price, we determine the optimal sales quantity in the 
retail channel as 
* 1( )
4r r
q b = . 
Given these optimal values, we obtain the optimal profit levels of the manufacturer 
and the retailer for a given br  as follows:  
* 1( )
8m r r
b
b
∏ = . 
* 1( )
16r r r
b
b
∏ = . 
Comparing the total profit in this case (3 /16 )rb with the total profit in the direct-
channel-only case (4 /16 )db  reveals the effect of double marginalization. The direct-
channel-only case does not have double marginalization because there is only a single 
decision maker.     
 66
                                               
 
CHAPTER 5 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we focus on two aspects of the dual channel strategy of a manufacturer: 
consumer preferences towards different channel formats (online or bricks-and-mortar) 
and the effects of double marginalization. As more and more manufacturers are opening 
direct sales channels and engaging in price competition with their retailers, 
understanding these aspects of the dual channel strategy is becoming crucial for survival 
in the competitive marketplace.  
We developed two game-theoretical models to address these issues. In both models, 
we consider a manufacturer selling products through a direct channel and an 
independent retail channel. The relation between the manufacturer and the retailer is 
governed by a wholesale price contract. The firms (channels) engage in simultaneous-
move price competition. Market demand in each channel depends on the sales prices of 
both channels. We solve these models with backwards induction and we illustrate our 
results with numerical examples. We characterize the wholesale price and the profits of 
the firms, as well as the sales quantities and sales prices in the channels.   
The two models are different along a number of important aspects. The focus of the 
first model is consumer valuation and preferences whereas the focus of the second 
model is double marginalization. While the channel demand functions in the second 
model is exogenously given, these functions in the first model are determined through a 
consumer choice process, by comparing the utilities that heterogeneous consumers 
derive from the two channels. The two channels in the first model differ in format 
(online versus bricks-and-mortar); whereas, there is no such difference in the second 
model. The channels in the first model share a fixed-size market. In the second model, 
the channel demands (and the size of the market) is a function of the sales prices in both 
channels. In fact, the key parameters of the second model are the price-sensitivity 
parameters of channels. Different from the first model, we consider a centralized firm 
case in the second model to assess the effects of double marginalization.   
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The first model allows us to determine optimal dual channel strategies for the 
manufacturer as a function of the consumer valuation of the product and the relative 
disadvantage of the online direct channel. We find parameter regions under which the 
manufacturer should use dual channel, direct-only or retail-only structures. In addition, 
we determined that the manufacturer shall serve the whole consumer population rather 
than serving partially for most parameter combinations.  
The second model allows us to characterize the inefficiencies due to double 
marginalization. We show how the sales prices and sales quantities in channels decrease 
and how channel profits suffer due to decentralization as a function of the price 
sensitivities in the two channels. We extend the standard inefficiency results in a retail-
only channel (which is studied extensively in the literature) into a dual-channel setting.  
An interesting future research direction is to conduct an experimental study based 
on the theoretical findings of our models. Like all other game-theoretical models, our 
models rest on certain theoretical assumptions, which might not capture how human 
beings make decisions. We would like to see if our assumptions and findings are 
consistent with real decision-maker behavior. To understand this, we might conduct 
experiments with human decision makers in which the subjects play the roles of the 
manufacturer and the retailer in our models and make decisions. We expect to see 
deviations in subject behavior from our theoretical findings due to behavioral factors 
such as irrational behavior, risk aversion, loss aversion, or fairness considerations.  
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Appendix A 
Behavioral Economics and Experimental Economics 
Game theory is useful in the study of economic problems, but real-life observations 
often deviate from game theory predictions. At this point, behavioral economics draw 
attention. Behavioral economics is a sub-field of economics that identifies the ways in 
which behavior differs from theoretical predictions and shows how this behavior matters 
in economic contexts. Behavioral economics improve economics by increasing the 
realism of behavioral underpinnings of economic analysis. As human beings are limited 
in their capacities to learn, think and act, behavioral economics is a fertile area for 
studying the implications of these limits. With the rise of behavioral economics, human 
behavior has become important in economics (Diamond and Vartiainen 2007).  
Experimental economics, the application of experimental methods to address 
economic questions, is a recent branch of economics. Increasing number of economists 
has begun to use experimental methods to evaluate economic propositions under 
carefully controlled conditions. Experimental economics is a field that tests whether the 
predictions of game theory are confirmed by individuals making decisions in a 
controlled environment (Friedman and Cassar 2004).  
Behavioral economics and experimental economics have both differences and 
similarities. Although behavioral economics rely extensively on experimental data, 
behavioral economics is a different sub-field than experimental economics at some 
points. Experimental economists focus on the use of experimentation as a research tool 
but behavioral economists focus on the psychological insights into economics. On the 
other hand, both sub-fields accept that their origins trace to psychology and they have 
become popular in the last quarter of 20th century (Camarer and Loewenstein 2004).  
Experimental Economics History 
Nineteenth century economists had the traditional view that economics is a non-
experimental science. Several practical obstacles towards the use of experimental 
methods such as impossibility of controlling the key economic variables, and of keeping 
background conditions fixed were identified. Despite various changes in economists’ 
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methodological practice, skepticism towards experimentation took a long time to fade 
away. A number of innovations at the level of scientific practice helped to introduce the 
idea of experiments in economics.  
Beginning in 1940s, experimental work improved following the growth and 
development of game theory. Game theory is useful in economics, because it offers 
predictions of interactive behavior that are clearly established and useful for 
experimental validation. In these years, economics was in the process of becoming a 
tool-based science and during this revolution economists came to accept that detailed 
analysis of several tools were essential to understand the real-world economy. The 
publication of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior (1944) contributed to the birth of experimental economics and subsequent 
developments of game and decision theory. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s work was 
fruitful for the scientists who were interested in the application to solve scientific, 
policy, and management problems.  
In late 1940s, playing game-theoretical problems became popular in mathematical 
communities and this helped game theory gain widespread popularity. A number of 
economists became interested in the idea that laboratory methods could be useful and 
helpful in economics. In these years, experimental economics evolved in three areas: 
market experiments, game experiments, and individual choice experiments. Chamberlin 
(1948) studied with Harvard graduate students to prove the impossibility of pure 
competition and performed the first market experiment. After that, some researchers 
conducted market experiments focusing on the predictions of the neoclassical price 
theory.  
In 1950s, extensive experimental projects were pursued at Penn State, Michigan, 
and Stanford Universities. Tucker (1950) developed what has become known as the 
“Prisoner’s dilemma” to illustrate the difficulty of analyzing certain kinds of games. 
Others who made individual decision making experiments focused on simpler 
environments in which strategic behavior is unnecessary and individuals only need to 
optimize. In 1952, a group of researchers at the University of Michigan ran a two-month 
seminar that was the first event devoted specifically to the design of experiments in 
decision processes.  In 1954, Ward Edwards at Michigan pioneered the experimental 
study of Expected Utility Theory. Researchers became increasingly interested in 
individual decision making experiments to examine the behavioral content of the axioms 
of expected utility theory. Siegel and Fouraker’s (1960) book was significant for the 
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bargaining behavior in game theory. Siegel was known as the first experimenter to 
highlight the importance of using real incentives to motivate subjects. Since Smith 
(1962), using experiments with human decision makers to understand the behavioral 
factors affecting decisions has grown. In 1963-64, a group of researchers working on the 
psychology of organizations (known as the Carnegie group) made use of a variety of 
methodologies such as role playing, business games, and simulations. In their projects, 
human decision makers took managerial decisions in an environment simulated by a 
computer. 
In 1970s, the landscape of experimental economics changed considerably and the 
field started to separate into sub-disciplines. Amos Tversky began collaborating with 
Daniel Kahneman on decision making. In 1974, an article by Tversky and Kahneman 
attracted attention and read widely as a challenge to the view that human beings were 
rational. Charles Plott and Vernon Smith (1978) started to run experiments and their 
collaboration led to the creation of the Caltech Laboratory and the training of the second 
and third generations of experimental economists. In these years, Smith (1976) 
highlighted the importance of monetary incentives to control subjects’ preferences in his 
papers. In late 1979s and early 1980s, alternative models to expected utility were 
characterized. In 1980s and 1990s, experimental economics expanded in new directions. 
Roth (1993) provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution of experimental 
economics during the period 1930-1960. Roth implied that effective experimental 
research builds off and enhances what is learned through traditional methodologies. 
Through this evolution, experiments have focused on developing new behavioral theory 
to explain the gaps between established economic theory and experimental results. 
In 2002, the Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to Vernon Smith, because he 
had integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially 
concerning human judgment and decision making under uncertainty, and to Daniel 
Kahneman, because he had established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical 
economic analysis especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms4. After this 
award, the growth of experiments as a valid, accepted methodology and the influence of 
psychological research in that growth have increased (Croson 2005).  
Economic experiments are usually applied in academic research to test policies, but 
they can also be used in business. Businesses have recognized the importance of 
                                                 
4http://www.nobelprize.org 
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experimental economics and have started to use it as a decision tool. Hewlett-Packard 
Company (HP) began an experimental economics program in 1994 and has developed 
experimental models to support business decisions. The firm recognized the importance 
of both experimental methods and economic modeling as tools to support business 
decisions. HP Research Laboratories5 have developed in-house experimental economics 
capabilities instead of relying on academic institutions. The firm has developed 
experimental models in several areas such as channel management, forecasting, and 
electronic markets and also has studied the behavior of sales channels under different 
contractual terms and business policies. In addition to HP, there are other experimental 
economics laboratories at IBM’s T.J. Watson Research Center and at such academic 
institutions as Caltech, Harvard Business School, and Penn State. A 2003 Newsweek 
article states: “Companies are always trying to predict future. These days, the field of 
experimental economics – which replicates market and business scenarios in the lab – is 
giving the crystal ball an upgrade.” (Foroohar 2003).  
In conclusion, in just a few decades, economics has been transformed from a 
discipline where experimental methods were considered ineffective, impractical, and 
useless, to one where some of the most important advancements are driven by laboratory 
data. Experimental economics field has seen exponential growth every decade. 
Experiments have expanded to include an emphasis on developing new behavioral 
theory to explain gaps between established economic theory and experimental results 
(Davis and Holt 1992, Guala 2005, Roth, 1995a).    
Advantages and Disadvantages of Experiments 
Experiments offer a number of advantages. Researchers conduct experiments to explore 
the reasons why behavior deviates from theory and produce results that are not optimal, 
and to design treatments that might reduce the deviations. Experiments are used to test 
and refine theories as well as to characterize new phenomena. Experiments investigate 
relationships by manipulating treatments to determine the exact effect on specific 
dependent variables in a way which would not be possible using naturally-occurring 
data. Although it is rarely possible to control the rules of interaction, the flow of 
information, and the reward system in the field, all can be controlled in experiments. 
Moreover, good experiments, whether in economics or in the natural sciences, generally 
                                                 
5 http://www.hpl.hp.com 
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involve simplification that permits to see causes and consequences clearly. Computers 
make it possible to model and simulate sophisticated economic environments.  
Experiments also offer advantages over economic (or, empirical) data. One might 
question why economic data is not used and why researchers create their data using 
experiments. First, useful data might not exist. Second, there can be useful data, but it 
might be confidential. Third, collection and verification of economic data might be very 
expensive. Fourth, it might be very difficult to verify field data since data is generally 
collected not by economists for scientific purposes, but by government employees or 
businessmen for other purposes. Fifth, data might not reflect the model that is in 
consideration. Finally, data may have problems, because there is an absence of control in 
many areas of economic research (Davis and Holt 1992).  
On the other hand, experiments possess some important disadvantages. To begin 
with, it is disputed how much an experiment reflects the real world. The results from the 
lab may not be applicable in the field. In addition to this, the effectiveness of 
experiments may depend on the recognition of some trade-offs and decision makers can 
skip such key points. The experience level of the subjects may not be same and this can 
affect the results of the experiments. Subjects may fail to use complete and unbiased 
instructions in a correct way. Since it is hard to motive the subjects during experiments, 
their answers to the questions can be poor predictors. Furthermore, it is not always 
possible to induce critical components for some economic environments in the 
laboratory. There might be technical difficulties in establishing and controlling the 
laboratory environment when the purpose of the experiment is to elicit information 
about individual preferences. Consequently, researchers should always be aware that 
experimental results might not be fully applicable to the real world.  
Experimental results often exhibit deviations from game-theoretical predictions for 
a number of reasons. First, players usually do not calculate the equilibrium strategies in 
the way a theorist would do, all they have to do is to respond optimally to the others’ 
decisions in the game under limited time frames. Second, the nature of monetary 
rewards, experience levels and any intentional deception of players are important. 
Finally, instructions, location, duration of experiments, and the physical environment 
also affect the results of games. At this point, control is essential since game theory 
predictions often depend sensitively on the choices players have, how they value 
outcomes, the order that they move and what they guess. For game-theoretical models, it 
is unlikely to think that pure logic alone will be enough, because game theory is about 
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groups of decision makers who consider other groups’ decisions and the results usually 
deviate from predictions.   
Experimental Studies in Operations Management 
Operations management (OM) is a broad field that includes product development, 
forecasting, process design and improvement, inventory management, and supply chain 
management. In the recent years, OM researchers have been using game theory widely. 
For example, OM literature has produced optimal contracting mechanisms for partners 
of supply chains using game theory (Cachon 2003). Experiments might be an important 
tool for testing such game-theoretic results in OM. Hence, OM appears to be a candidate 
for behavioral economics applications.  
Behavioral research in the field of operations management is important since human 
behavior has a significant influence on the way operating systems work, how they work, 
and how they respond to management interventions. Behavioral considerations in OM 
are almost as old as the operations management itself. For instance, in 1920s and 30s, 
research conducted by Mayo, Roethlisberger, and Dickson examined both the physical 
influences of the workplace and its psychological aspects (Gino and Pisano 2006). 
Understanding of human behavior is significant, because the success of OM tools and 
techniques depend heavily on it. Although environment, characteristics of operations 
and tools available to OM have changed, one thing has not changed: in the majority of 
operations people has been a critical component of the system. People influence both the 
functioning of a system and the way operating systems perform. Recently, a number of 
researchers have been interested in the use of human experiments in operations 
management. The implication of human experiments to operational problems branch 
many sub-disciplines including supply chain management (SCM), production control, 
quality management, and operations technology (Bendoly et al. 2006).  
Supply chain management is one of the areas in which experimental economics 
methods have been used. SCM is a set of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate 
multiple decision makers such as suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses, and stores, so 
that merchandise is produced and distributed at the right time, to the right locations, and 
at the right quantities (Simchi-Levi et al. 2008). Since supply chains involve multiple 
decision makers, SCM is a natural area to apply behavioral study. Researchers 
investigate cooperative and competitive behavior in different institutional settings, 
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including bargaining, reputation systems, and bidding behavior in auctions in supply 
chains. Recently, controlled human experiments have been used to identify and better 
understand the behavioral factors that affect efforts to coordinate supply chains. By 
doing experiments, firms can examine the behavioral impact of reducing ordering and 
shipping delays, adding point of sale (POS) data sharing systems, and adding inventory 
information sharing systems. 
One of the most known examples of the behavioral experiments in SCM is the beer 
distribution game (Figure B-1). Beer distribution game is a simulation game created by a 
group of MIT Sloan School of Management in early 1960s to simulate the ordering and 
production decisions of four-level multiple decision makers (a retailer, wholesaler, 
distributor, and manufacturer). Players decide how many cases of beer to order from 
immediate suppliers to maintain sufficient inventory to fill orders from their immediate 
customers each week. The objective of a player is to minimize the sum of holding and 
shortage costs of its firm.  
 
 
Figure A-1: The Beer Distribution Game 
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The beer game is related to the “Bullwhip effect” that has been observed in many 
supply chains: While customer demand does not vary much, the fluctuation in order 
levels, as well as in inventory and back-order levels increase considerably as one moves 
up in the supply chain. Procter and Gamble first coined the term bullwhip effect to 
describe the ordering behavior between customers and suppliers of diapers. Hewlett-
Packard is another firm that faces the bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 1997). To mitigate the 
bullwhip effect, companies should improve communication along the supply chain, 
work with firms upstream and downstream in the supply chain and enhance sources of 
forecast data.  
Newsvendor problem is another important application area of experiments in SCM. 
In the newsvendor problem, a decision maker determines the order quantity for a single 
selling season with stochastic demand. This problem is called the newsvendor problem, 
because its prototype is the problem faced by a newsvendor trying to decide how many 
newspapers to stock before observing demand. The objective is to minimize the 
expected total cost of ordering too much or too little with respect to unknown demand. 
The theoretical profit-maximizing order quantity is known, however, human subjects’ 
decisions in experiments are observed to deviate from theoretical predictions. 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) conducted the first experimental study of the newsvendor 
problem and observed a pattern of behavior that is odd for theory with expected profit 
maximization as well as with alternative risk profiles. 
Literature Survey 
The evaluation of economic theories under controlled laboratory conditions is a 
relatively recent development and it has provided an important foundation for bridging 
the gap between economic theory and observation. In late 1940s and 1950s, a number of 
economists independently became interested in the notion that laboratory methods could 
be practical in the economic theories. Chamberlin reported the first market experiment 
describing an actual experiment with a market under laboratory conditions in 1948. 
Chamberlin’s paper is highly suggestive in presenting the possibilities of experimental 
techniques in the study of applied market theory. Then, a similar experimental supply 
and demand model is used by Smith (1962).  
A series of experimental games have been designed to study some of the hypotheses 
of neoclassical competitive market theory. Since these studies, interest in using 
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experiments with human decision makers to understand the behavioral factors affecting 
decisions has grown. Researchers have used experimental economics methods to test 
policies in such areas as transportation, emissions trading, water distribution, power 
transmission networks and natural gas pipelines. There are several studies with a strong 
game-theoretic component of experimental economics in practice. Plott (1987) presents 
a classic experimental treatment of problems such as the allocation of airplane slots and 
strategic agenda manipulation by guiding game-theoretic models. Roth (2002) shows 
how experimental economics and game theory have been used in the design of US 
Federal Communications Commission auctions for the rights to radio spectrum and in 
the design of labor clearing houses for American doctors (see Camerer 2003 for other 
examples).  
Employment of experimental methods has recently increased in the operations 
management (OM) literature. Bendoly et al. (2006) provide a perspective on the 
importance of behavioral research to OM field, availability of prior research and the 
opportunities that lie ahead. Gino and Pisano (2006) emphasize the term “behavioral 
operations” to explore the theoretical and practical implications of incorporating 
behavioral and cognitive factors into models of operations. Bolton and Kwasnica (2002) 
mention that experiments have three primary uses related with behavioral issues such as 
wind tunnel testing, assessing attitudes towards values and risks, and interactive learning 
tools. 
In the OM literature, experimental methods have mainly been used in three areas: 
the bullwhip effect, the newsvendor problem and OM contracting. Sterman (1989) is the 
first to use a simulated industrial production and distribution system, the beer 
distribution game, to study the causes of bullwhip effect. Furthermore, Sterman (1989) is 
also the first to demonstrate that the bullwhip effect has behavioral as well as operational 
causes. In the paper, an anchoring and adjustment heuristic for stock management is 
proposed to explain the subjects’ decision processes. Like Sterman (1989), Lee et al. 
(1997) are interested in the causes and managerial implications of the bullwhip effect 
and they develop simple mathematical models of supply chains. They describe four of 
the most common causes of the bullwhip effect: demand signal processing, rationing 
game, order batching, and price variations. Chen (1999) extends this research by 
investigating the effect of irrational behavior on supply chain performance. In the model, 
demand distribution is stationary and known to participants to demonstrate the 
importance for upstream members of the supply chain to have access to exact customer 
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demand information. Croson and Donohue (2006) study the behavioral causes of the 
bullwhip effect and investigate the potential benefit that inventory information sharing 
offers. Experimental results reveal that bullwhip effect still exits when normal 
operational causes are removed and that sharing real time inventory information reduces 
the bullwhip effect but not in the manner expected. Croson et al. (2004) propose a new 
behavioral cause of the bullwhip effect, coordination risk, that triggers order 
amplification leading the bullwhip effect. According to the model, players place 
excessive orders to address the perceived risk that their partners in the beer game will 
not behave optimally.  
Croson and Donohue (2002) discuss the beer game experiment, popular as a tool for 
teaching supply chain management and suggest the benefits that experimental research 
can bring to supply chain management. They survey results from a series of human 
experiments to examine the behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect. The authors find 
cognitive limitations on part of managers; in particular, an underweighting of the supply 
line. That is, the subjects in the beer game experiments amplify orders because they fail 
to account adequately for the outstanding orders in transit.. Croson and Donohue (2003) 
mention that sharing point of sale (POS) data can help reduce the bullwhip effect and 
reduce supply chain costs when demand is stationary and known. In contrast, Steckel et 
al. (2004) determine that POS data can bias upstream participants’ estimates of future 
demand, increasing costs when the distribution of consumer demand is nonstationary 
and unknown. Wu and Katok (2006) study how the bullwhip effect might be mitigated 
and investigate the effect of learning and communication on the bullwhip effect in 
supply chains. Croson and Donohue (2005) report the results of an experiment to 
examine whether giving supply chain partners access to downstream or upstream 
inventory information is more effective. 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) conduct the first experimental study on the 
newsvendor problem. They find that many people, even those who have been exposed to 
the solution in an MBA classroom, make suboptimal and biased newsvendor choices. It 
is shown that the pattern of choices is not consistent with risk-aversion, risk-seeking 
preferences, prospect theory preferences, waste aversion, stockout aversion, or the 
consequences of undervaluing opportunity costs. Similar to Sterman (1989), the authors 
offer heuristic as explanation and consider two alternative anchoring and insufficient 
adjustment heuristics called the mean anchor heuristic and the chasing demand 
heuristic. Bolton and Katok (2006) present a laboratory investigation of learning-by-
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doing in the newsvendor problem and their experiments investigate how experience or 
feedback can improve newsvendor problem choice by promoting better learning-by-
doing.  
Experimental methods have also been used in channel contract management 
research in industry. Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) has recognized the potential of 
this methodology as a decision support tool. HP uses experiments to shape its policies 
with retailers, such as return policies, price-protection policies, and minimum 
advertised-price policies (see, for example, Charness and Chen 2002, Chen and Huang 
2005).  
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Appendix B 
Table B-1: Numerical Examples Results 
v k cs(opt.case) w* Pd* Pr* qd* qr* ql* Pim* Pir*
0,25 0 DuF 0,00 0,67 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,00 0,44 0,11
0,25 0,25 DuF 0,00 0,75 0,50 0,60 0,40 0,00 0,45 0,20
0,25 0,5 DuF 0,00 0,83 0,67 0,56 0,44 0,00 0,46 0,30
0,25 0,75 DuF 0,00 0,92 0,83 0,52 0,48 0,00 0,48 0,40
0,25 1 DuF 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,50
0,25 1,25 DuF 0,00 1,08 1,17 0,48 0,52 0,00 0,52 0,60
0,25 1,5 DuF 0,00 1,17 1,33 0,47 0,53 0,00 0,54 0,71
0,25 1,75 DuF 0,00 1,25 1,50 0,45 0,55 0,00 0,57 0,82
0,25 2 DuF 0,00 1,33 1,67 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,59 0,93
0,25 2,25 DuF 0,00 1,42 1,83 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,62 1,03
0,25 2,5 DuF 0,00 1,50 2,00 0,43 0,57 0,00 0,64 1,14
0,25 2,75 DuF 0,00 1,58 2,17 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,67 1,25
0,25 3 DuF 0,00 1,67 2,33 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,69 1,36
0,25 3,25 DuF 0,00 1,75 2,50 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,72 1,47
0,25 3,5 DuF 0,00 1,83 2,67 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,75 1,58
0,25 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
0,25 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
0,25 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
0,25 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
0,25 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
0,25 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24
0,5 0 DiF 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00
0,5 0,25 DuF 0,00 0,75 0,50 0,60 0,40 0,00 0,45 0,20
0,5 0,5 DuF 0,00 0,83 0,67 0,56 0,44 0,00 0,46 0,30
0,5 0,75 DuF 0,00 0,92 0,83 0,52 0,48 0,00 0,48 0,40
0,5 1 DuF 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,50
0,5 1,25 DuF 0,00 1,08 1,17 0,48 0,52 0,00 0,52 0,60
0,5 1,5 DuF 0,00 1,17 1,33 0,47 0,53 0,00 0,54 0,71
0,5 1,75 DuF 0,00 1,25 1,50 0,45 0,55 0,00 0,57 0,82
0,5 2 DuF 0,00 1,33 1,67 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,59 0,93
0,5 2,25 DuF 0,00 1,42 1,83 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,62 1,03
0,5 2,5 DuF 0,00 1,50 2,00 0,43 0,57 0,00 0,64 1,14
0,5 2,75 DuF 0,00 1,58 2,17 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,67 1,25
0,5 3 DuF 0,00 1,67 2,33 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,69 1,36
0,5 3,25 DuF 0,00 1,75 2,50 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,72 1,47
0,5 3,5 DuF 0,00 1,83 2,67 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,75 1,58
0,5 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
0,5 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
0,5 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
0,5 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
0,5 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
0,5 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24
0,75 0 DiF 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
0,75 0,25 DiF 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00
0,75 0,5 DuF 0,00 0,83 0,67 0,56 0,44 0,00 0,46 0,30
0,75 0,75 DuF 0,00 0,92 0,83 0,52 0,48 0,00 0,48 0,40
0,75 1 DuF 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,50
0,75 1,25 DuF 0,00 1,08 1,17 0,48 0,52 0,00 0,52 0,60
0,75 1,5 DuF 0,00 1,17 1,33 0,47 0,53 0,00 0,54 0,71
0,75 1,75 DuF 0,00 1,25 1,50 0,45 0,55 0,00 0,57 0,82
0,75 2 DuF 0,00 1,33 1,67 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,59 0,93
0,75 2,25 DuF 0,00 1,42 1,83 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,62 1,03
0,75 2,5 DuF 0,00 1,50 2,00 0,43 0,57 0,00 0,64 1,14
0,75 2,75 DuF 0,00 1,58 2,17 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,67 1,25
0,75 3 DuF 0,00 1,67 2,33 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,69 1,36
0,75 3,25 DuF 0,00 1,75 2,50 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,72 1,47
0,75 3,5 DuF 0,00 1,83 2,67 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,75 1,58
0,75 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
0,75 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
0,75 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
0,75 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
0,75 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
0,75 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24  
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1 0 DiF 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
1 0,25 DiF 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1 0,5 DiP 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00
1 0,75 DuF 0,00 0,92 0,83 0,52 0,48 0,00 0,48 0,40
1 1 DuF 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,50
1 1,25 DuF 0,00 1,08 1,17 0,48 0,52 0,00 0,52 0,60
1 1,5 DuF 0,00 1,17 1,33 0,47 0,53 0,00 0,54 0,71
1 1,75 DuF 0,00 1,25 1,50 0,45 0,55 0,00 0,57 0,82
1 2 DuF 0,00 1,33 1,67 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,59 0,93
1 2,25 DuF 0,00 1,42 1,83 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,62 1,03
1 2,5 DuF 0,00 1,50 2,00 0,43 0,57 0,00 0,64 1,14
1 2,75 DuF 0,00 1,58 2,17 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,67 1,25
1 3 DuF 0,00 1,67 2,33 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,69 1,36
1 3,25 DuF 0,00 1,75 2,50 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,72 1,47
1 3,5 DuF 0,00 1,83 2,67 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,75 1,58
1 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
1 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
1 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
1 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
1 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
1 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24
1,25 0 DiF 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
1,25 0,25 DiF 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
1,25 0,5 DiF 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,25 0,75 DiP 0,00 0,63 0,00 0,83 0,00 0,17 0,52 0,00
1,25 1 DuP 0,63 0,63 0,94 0,63 0,31 0,06 0,59 0,10
1,25 1,25 DuF 0,00 1,08 1,17 0,48 0,52 0,00 0,52 0,60
1,25 1,5 DuF 0,00 1,17 1,33 0,47 0,53 0,00 0,54 0,71
1,25 1,75 DuF 0,00 1,25 1,50 0,45 0,55 0,00 0,57 0,82
1,25 2 DuF 0,00 1,33 1,67 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,59 0,93
1,25 2,25 DuF 0,00 1,42 1,83 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,62 1,03
1,25 2,5 DuF 0,00 1,50 2,00 0,43 0,57 0,00 0,64 1,14
1,25 2,75 DuF 0,00 1,58 2,17 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,67 1,25
1,25 3 DuF 0,00 1,67 2,33 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,69 1,36
1,25 3,25 DuF 0,00 1,75 2,50 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,72 1,47
1,25 3,5 DuF 0,00 1,83 2,67 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,75 1,58
1,25 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
1,25 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
1,25 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
1,25 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
1,25 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
1,25 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24
1,5 0 DiF 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
1,5 0,25 DiF 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
1,5 0,5 DiF 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
1,5 0,75 DiP 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,5 1 DiP 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,25 0,56 0,00
1,5 1,25 DuP 0,75 0,75 1,13 0,60 0,38 0,03 0,73 0,14
1,5 1,5 DuP 0,75 0,75 1,13 0,50 0,38 0,13 0,66 0,14
1,5 1,75 DuP 0,75 0,75 1,13 0,43 0,38 0,20 0,60 0,14
1,5 2 DuF 0,00 1,33 1,67 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,59 0,93
1,5 2,25 DuF 0,00 1,42 1,83 0,44 0,56 0,00 0,62 1,03
1,5 2,5 DuF 0,00 1,50 2,00 0,43 0,57 0,00 0,64 1,14
1,5 2,75 DuF 0,00 1,58 2,17 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,67 1,25
1,5 3 DuF 0,00 1,67 2,33 0,42 0,58 0,00 0,69 1,36
1,5 3,25 DuF 0,00 1,75 2,50 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,72 1,47
1,5 3,5 DuF 0,00 1,83 2,67 0,41 0,59 0,00 0,75 1,58
1,5 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
1,5 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
1,5 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
1,5 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
1,5 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
1,5 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24  
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1,75 0 DiF 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
1,75 0,25 DiF 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
1,75 0,5 DiF 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
1,75 0,75 DiF 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
1,75 1 DiP 0,00 0,88 0,00 0,88 0,00 0,13 0,77 0,00
1,75 1,25 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 1,5 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 1,75 DuP 0,88 0,88 1,31 0,50 0,44 0,06 0,82 0,19
1,75 2 DuP 0,88 0,88 1,31 0,44 0,44 0,13 0,77 0,19
1,75 2,25 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 2,5 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 2,75 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 3 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 3,25 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 3,5 ReF 0,75 0,00 0,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,00
1,75 3,75 DuF 0,00 1,92 2,83 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,77 1,69
1,75 4 DuF 0,00 2,00 3,00 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,80 1,80
1,75 4,25 DuF 0,00 2,08 3,17 0,40 0,60 0,00 0,83 1,91
1,75 4,5 DuF 0,00 2,17 3,33 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,85 2,02
1,75 4,75 DuF 0,00 2,25 3,50 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,88 2,13
1,75 5 DuF 0,00 2,33 3,67 0,39 0,61 0,00 0,91 2,24
2 0 DiF 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
2 0,25 DiF 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2 0,5 DiF 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2 0,75 DiF 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2 1 DuF 0,50 1,50 1,50 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,50
2 1,25 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 1,5 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 1,75 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 2 DuP 1,00 1,00 1,50 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,25
2 2,25 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 2,5 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 2,75 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 3 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 3,25 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 3,5 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 3,75 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 4 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 4,25 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 4,5 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 4,75 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2 5 ReF 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
2,25 0 DiF 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
2,25 0,25 DiF 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
2,25 0,5 DiF 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,25 0,75 DiF 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,25 1 DuF 0,75 1,75 1,75 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,25 0,50
2,25 1,25 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 1,5 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 1,75 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 2 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 2,25 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 2,5 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 2,75 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 3 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 3,25 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 3,5 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 3,75 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 4 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 4,25 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 4,5 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 4,75 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00
2,25 5 ReF 1,25 0,00 1,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,25 0,00  
 
 
 82
2,5 0 DiF 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
2,5 0,25 DiF 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
2,5 0,5 DiF 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
2,5 0,75 DiF 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,5 1 DuF 1,00 2,00 2,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,50 0,50
2,5 1,25 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 1,5 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 1,75 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 2 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 2,25 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 2,5 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 2,75 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 3 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 3,25 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 3,5 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 3,75 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 4 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 4,25 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 4,5 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 4,75 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,5 5 ReF 1,50 0,00 1,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,50 0,00
2,75 0 DiF 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
2,75 0,25 DiF 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
2,75 0,5 DiF 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
2,75 0,75 DiF 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
2,75 1 DuF 1,25 2,25 2,25 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,75 0,50
2,75 1,25 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 1,5 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 1,75 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 2 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 2,25 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 2,5 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 2,75 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 3 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 3,25 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 3,5 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 3,75 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 4 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 4,25 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 4,5 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 4,75 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
2,75 5 ReF 1,75 0,00 1,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,75 0,00
3 0 DiF 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
3 0,25 DiF 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3 0,5 DiF 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3 0,75 DiF 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3 1 DuF 1,50 2,50 2,50 0,50 0,50 0,00 2,00 0,50
3 1,25 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 1,5 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 1,75 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 2 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 2,25 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 2,5 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 2,75 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 3 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 3,25 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 3,5 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 3,75 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 4 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 4,25 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 4,5 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 4,75 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
3 5 ReF 2,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00  
 
 
 83
3,25 0 DiF 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
3,25 0,25 DiF 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
3,25 0,5 DiF 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,25 0,75 DiF 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,25 1 DuF 1,75 2,75 2,75 0,50 0,50 0,00 2,25 0,50
3,25 1,25 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 1,5 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 1,75 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 2 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 2,25 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 2,5 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 2,75 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 3 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 3,25 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 3,5 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 3,75 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 4 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 4,25 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 4,5 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 4,75 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,25 5 ReF 2,25 0,00 2,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,25 0,00
3,5 0 DiF 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
3,5 0,25 DiF 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
3,5 0,5 DiF 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
3,5 0,75 DiF 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,5 1 DuF 2,00 3,00 3,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 2,50 0,50
3,5 1,25 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 1,5 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 1,75 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 2 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 2,25 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 2,5 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 2,75 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 3 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 3,25 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 3,5 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 3,75 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 4 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 4,25 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 4,5 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 4,75 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,5 5 ReF 2,50 0,00 2,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,50 0,00
3,75 0 DiF 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
3,75 0,25 DiF 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
3,75 0,5 DiF 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
3,75 0,75 DiF 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
3,75 1 DuF 2,25 3,25 3,25 0,50 0,50 0,00 2,75 0,50
3,75 1,25 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 1,5 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 1,75 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 2 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 2,25 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 2,5 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 2,75 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 3 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 3,25 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 3,5 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 3,75 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 4 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 4,25 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 4,5 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 4,75 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00
3,75 5 ReF 2,75 0,00 2,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,75 0,00  
 
 
 84
4 0 DiF 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
4 0,25 DiF 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4 0,5 DiF 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4 0,75 DiF 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4 1 DuF 2,50 3,50 3,50 0,50 0,50 0,00 3,00 0,50
4 1,25 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 1,5 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 1,75 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 2 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 2,25 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 2,5 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 2,75 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 3 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 3,25 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 3,5 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 3,75 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 4 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 4,25 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 4,5 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 4,75 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4 5 ReF 3,00 0,00 3,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00 0,00
4,25 0 DiF 0,00 4,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,25 0,00
4,25 0,25 DiF 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
4,25 0,5 DiF 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,25 0,75 DiF 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,25 1 DuF 2,75 3,75 3,75 0,50 0,50 0,00 3,25 0,50
4,25 1,25 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 1,5 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 1,75 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 2 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 2,25 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 2,5 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 2,75 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 3 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 3,25 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 3,5 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 3,75 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 4 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 4,25 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 4,5 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 4,75 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,25 5 ReF 3,25 0,00 3,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,25 0,00
4,5 0 DiF 0,00 4,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,50 0,00
4,5 0,25 DiF 0,00 4,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,25 0,00
4,5 0,5 DiF 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
4,5 0,75 DiF 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,5 1 DuF 3,00 4,00 4,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 3,50 0,50
4,5 1,25 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 1,5 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 1,75 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 2 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 2,25 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 2,5 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 2,75 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 3 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 3,25 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 3,5 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 3,75 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 4 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 4,25 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 4,5 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 4,75 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00
4,5 5 ReF 3,50 0,00 3,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,50 0,00  
 
 
 85
4,75 0 DiF 0,00 4,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,75 0,00
4,75 0,25 DiF 0,00 4,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,50 0,00
4,75 0,5 DiF 0,00 4,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,25 0,00
4,75 0,75 DiF 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
4,75 1 DuF 3,25 4,25 4,25 0,50 0,50 0,00 3,75 0,50
4,75 1,25 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 1,5 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 1,75 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 2 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 2,25 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 2,5 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 2,75 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 3 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 3,25 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 3,5 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 3,75 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 4 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 4,25 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 4,5 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 4,75 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
4,75 5 ReF 3,75 0,00 3,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,75 0,00
5 0 DiF 0,00 5,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 5,00 0,00
5 0,25 DiF 0,00 4,75 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,75 0,00
5 0,5 DiF 0,00 4,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,50 0,00
5 0,75 DiF 0,00 4,25 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,25 0,00
5 1 DuF 3,50 4,50 4,50 0,50 0,50 0,00 4,00 0,50
5 1,25 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 1,5 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 1,75 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 2 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 2,25 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 2,5 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 2,75 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 3 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 3,25 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 3,5 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 3,75 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 4 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 4,25 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 4,5 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 4,75 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00
5 5 ReF 4,00 0,00 4,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 4,00 0,00  
 
 86
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Ahn, H., I. Duenyas, R. Q. Zhang. 2002. Price competition between retailers and 
manufacturer-owned stores. Working Paper, Department of Industrial Engineering and 
Operations Management, University of California, Berkeley.  
 
Bannon, L. 2000. Selling Barbie online may pit Mattel vs. Stores. Wall Street Journal 
(November 17). 
 
Bell, D. R., Y. Wang, V. Padmanabhan. 2002.  An explanation for partial forward 
integration: Why manufacturers become marketers. Working Paper, The Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
Bell, D. R., Y. Wang, V. Padmanabhan. 2003. The effect of partial forward integration 
on retailer behavior: An explanation for co-located stores. Working Paper, University of 
Pennsylvania.  
 
Bendoly, E., K. Donohue, K. L. Schultz. 2006. Behavior in operations management: 
Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions. Journal of Operations 
Management 24 737-752. 
 
Bennett, A. 1994. Nobel in economics is awarded to three for pioneering work in game 
theory. The Wall Street Journal (October 12).  
 
Bernstein, F., A. Federgruen. 2004. A general equilibrium model for industries with 
price and service competition. Operations Research 52 868-886. 
 
Bolton, G. E., A. M. Kwasnika. 2002. Introduction to the special issue on experimental 
economics in practice. Interfaces 32(5) 1-3. 
 
 87
Bolton, G., E. Katok. 2006. Learning-by-doing in the newsvendor problem: A laboratory 
investigation of the role of experience and feedback. Working Paper, Penn State 
University, University Park, PA. 
 
Boyaci, T. 2005. Competitive stocking and coordination in a multiple-channel 
distribution system. IIE Transactions 37 407-427. 
 
Bucklin, C. B., P. A. Thomas-Graham, E. A. Webster. 1997. Channel conflict: When is 
it dangerous?. The McKinsey Quarterly 3 36-43. 
 
Cachon, G. P. 2003. Supply chain coordination with contracts. A. G. De Kok, S. C. 
Grave, eds. Hand-books in Operations Research and Management Science. Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
 
Camarer, C. F., G. Loewenstein. 2004. Behavioral economics: Past, present, future. C. F. 
Camarer, G. Loewenstein, M. Rabin, eds. Advances in Behavioral Economics. New 
York, Russel Sage, 3-51.  
 
Camerer, C. F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.  
 
Cattani, K. D., W. G. Gilland, H. S. Heese, J. M. Swaminathan. 2006. Pricing strategy 
for a manufacturer adding a direct channel that competes with the traditional channel. 
Production and Operations Management 15 40-56. 
 
Cattani, K. D., W. G. Gilland, J. M. Swaminathan. 2004. Coordinating internet and 
traditional supply chains. D. Simchi-Levi, D. Wu, M. Shen, eds. Supply chain analysis 
in the ebusiness era. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.  
 
Chamberlin, E. 1948. An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political Economics 
56(2) 95-108. 
 
Charness, G., K. Chen. 2002. Minimum advertised price policy rules and retailer 
behavior: An experiment. Interfaces 32(5) 62-73. 
 88
 
Chen, F. 1999. Decentralized supply chains subject to information delays. Management 
Science 45 1016-1090. 
 
Chen, K., S. Huang. 2005. Durable goods lease contracts and used-goods market 
behavior: An experimental study. A. Rapoport, R. Zwick, eds. Experimental Business 
Research, Vol 2: Economics and Managerial Perspectives. Springer Dordrecht, New 
York. NY. 
 
Chen, K. Y., M. Kaya, Ö. Özer. 2008. Dual sales channel management with availability-
based service competition. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (MSOM) 
Journal 10(4) 654-675. 
 
Chiang, W. K., D. Chhajed, J. D. Hess. 2003. Direct marketing, indirect profits: A 
strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science 49 1-20. 
 
Collinger, T. 1998. Lines separating sales channels blur: Manufacturers, direct sellers, 
retailers invade each others' turf.  Advertising Age 34 (March 30). 
 
Croson, R. 2005. The method of experimental economics. International Negotiation 10 
131- 148.  
 
Croson, R., K. Donohue. 2002. Experimental economics and supply-chain management. 
Interfaces 32(5) 74-82.  
 
Croson, R., K. Donohue. 2003. Impact of point of sale (POS) data sharing on supply-
chain management: An experimental study. Production and Operations Management 
12(1) 1-11.  
 
Croson, R., K. Donohue. 2005. Upstream versus downstream information and its impact 
on the bullwhip effect. System Dynamics Review 21(3) 249-260.  
 
Croson, R., K. Donohue. 2006. Behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect and the 
observed value of inventory information. Management Science 52(3) 323-336.  
 89
Croson. R., K. Donohue, E. Katok, J. Sterman. 2004. Order stability in supply chains: 
Coordination risk and the role of coordination stock. Working Paper, MIT, Boston, MA. 
 
Cui, T. H., J. S. Raju, Z. J. Zhang. 2006. Fairness and channel coordination. 
Management Science 53(8) 1303-1314. 
 
Davis, D. D., C. A. Holt. 1992. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ.  
 
Diamond, P., H. Vartiainen. 2007. Behavioral Economics and Its Applications. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Edwards, W. 1954. The theory of decision making. Psychological Bulletin 51(4) 380-
417. 
 
Foroohar, R. 2003. A new “Wind tunnel” for companies. Newsweek (October 20). 
 
Friedman, D., A. Cassar. 2004. Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental 
Economics. Routledge. 
 
Gibbons, R. 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. Prentice Hall, Harlow, England. 
 
Gino, F., G. Pisano. 2006. Behavioral operations. Working Paper, Harvard University, 
Boston, MA.  
 
Guala, F. 2005. The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  
 
Hall, J., E. Porteus. 2000. Customer service competition in capacitated systems. 
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2 144-165. 
 
Hendershott, T., J. Zhang. 2006. A model of direct and intermediated sales. Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 15 279-316.  
 
 90
Ho, T., J. Zhang. 2007. Designing pricing contracts for the boundedly rational 
customers: Does the framing of the fixed fee matter? Working Paper, UC Berkeley, 
Berkeley, CA.  
 
Hotelling, H. 1929. Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39 41-57. 
 
Ingene, C. A., M. E. Parry. 1995(b). Channel coordination when retailers compete. 
Marketing Science 14(4) 360-377.  
 
Ingene, C. A., M. E. Parry. 1998. Manufacturer-optimal wholesale pricing when retailers 
compete. Marketing Letters 9(1) 65-77.  
 
Ingene, C. A., M. E. Parry. 2000. Is channel cordiantion all it is cracked up to be?. 
Journal of Retailing 76(4) 511-547. 
 
Iyer, G. 1998. Coordinating channels under price and non-price competition. Marketing 
Sceince 17(4) 338-355.  
 
Katok, E., D. Thomas, A. M. Davis. 2006. Inventory service level agreements as 
coordination mechanisms: The affect of review periods. Working Paper, Penn State 
University. University Park, PA. 
 
Katok, E., D. Wu. 2006. Contracting in supply chains: A laboratory investigation. 
Working Paper, Penn State University. University Park, PA.  
 
Keser, C., G. A. Paleologo. 2004. Experimental investigation of supplier-retailer 
contracts: The wholesale price contract. Working paper, IBM T. J.Watson Research 
Center, Yorktown Heights, NY. 
 
Kumar, N., R. Ruan. 2002. On strategic pricing and complementing the retail channel 
with a direct internet channel. Working Paper, University of Texas at Dallas.  
 
Lal, R. 1990. Improving channel coordination through franchising. Marketing Science 
9(4) 299-318. 
 91
Lee, H. L., V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang. 1997. Information distortion in a supply chain: 
The bullwhip effect. Management Science 43(4) 546-558. 
 
Machlis, S. 1998c. Beauty product sites facing channel clash. Computerworld 24 
(November 9). 
 
McWilliams, G. 1998. Mimicking Dell, Compaq to sell its PCs directly. The Wall Street 
Journal B1. 
 
Nasireti, R. 1998. IBM plans to sell some gear directly to fight its rivals. The Wall Street 
Journal (June 5).  
 
Netessine, S., N. Rudi. 2006. Supply chain choice on the Internet. Management Science 
52 844-864. 
 
Plott, C. R., V. L. Smith. 1978. An experimental examination of two exchange 
institutions. Review of Economic Studies 45 133-153. 
 
Plott, C. R. 1987. Dimensions of parallelism: some policy applications of experimental 
methods. A.E. Roth ed. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, New York.  
 
Rhee, B., S. Y. Park. 2000. Online stores as a new direct channel and emerging hybrid 
channel system. Working Paper, HKUST.  
 
Roth, A. E. 1993. On the early history of experimental economics. Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought 15 184–209. 
 
Roth, A. E. 1995a. Introduction to experimental economics. J. Kagel, A. E. Roth, eds. 
Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 3-109. 
 
Roth, A. E. 2002. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and 
computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70 1341-1378.  
 
 92
Schweitzer, M. E., G. P. Cachon. 2000. Decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a 
known demand distribution: Experimental evidence. Management Science 46(3) 404-
420. 
 
Seifert, R. W., U. W. Thonemann, M. A. Sieke. 2006. Integrating direct and indirect 
sales channels under decentralized decision-making. International Journal of Production 
Economics 103 209-229. 
 
Siegel, S., L. E. Fouraker. 1960. Bargaining and Group Decision Making.  McGraw 
Hill, New York, NY.  
 
Simchi-Levi, D., P. Kaminsky, E. Simchi-Levi. 2008. Designing and Managing the 
Supply Chain: Concepts, Strategies and Case Studies (3rd Edition). McGraw Hill, New 
York, NY.  
 
Smith, V. 1962. An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of 
Political Economics 70(2) 111-137.  
 
Smith, V. 1976. Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American Economic 
Review 66(2) 274-279. 
 
Spooner, J. G. 2002. Chip price war redux: AMD follows Intel. http://www.CNet 
News.com. 
 
Steckel, J. H., S. Gupta, A. Banerji. 2004. Supply chain decision making: Will shorter 
cycle times and shared point-of-sale information necessarily help?. Management Science 
50(4), 458-464. 
 
Sterman, J. 1989. Modeling managerial behavior: Misperceptions of feedback in a 
dynamic decision making experiment. Management Science 35(3), 321-339.   
 
Tsay, A. A., N. Agrawal. 2000. Channel dynamics under price and service competition. 
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(4) 372-391.  
 93
Tsay, A. A., N. Agrawal. 2001. Manufacturer and reseller perspectives on channel 
conflict and coordination in multiple-channel distribution. Working Paper, Santa Clara 
University. 
 
Tsay, A. A., N. Agrawal. 2004a. Modeling conflict and coordination in multi-channel 
distribution systems: A review. Simchi-Levi, D., Wu, D., Shen, M., eds. Forthcoming in 
Supply Chain Analysis in the eBusiness Era. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, 
MA.  
 
Tsay, A. A., N. Agrawal. 2004b. Channel conflict and coordination in the e-commerce 
age. Production and Operations Management 13 93-110. 
 
Tucker, A. W. 1950. A two-person dilemma. Working Paper, Stanford University. 
Published under the heading On Jargon: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. 1980. UMAP Journal 
101 (1).  
 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. 
Science 185 1124-1130. 
 
Von Neumann, J., O. Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Winter, R. 1993. Vertical control and price versus nonprice competition. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108 (1) 61-76. 
  
Wu, D. Y., E. Katok. 2006. Learning, communication, and the bullwhip effect. Journal 
of Operations Management 24 839-850.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
